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Abstract
We document systematic and significant time variation in US lifecycle non-
durable consumption profiles. Consumption profiles have consistently become
flatter: intergenerational differences in consumption across age groups have
decreased over time. Pooling data across different periods to identify lifecycle
profiles and failing to account for unobserved heterogeneity masks relevant time
variations and may artificially generate hump-shaped consumption age profiles.
The main driver behind lifecycle consumption variations are lifecycle income
changes, which display similar flattening. Employing a lifecycle model we show
changes in income are sufficient to match the movements in consumption.
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The lifecycle profile of consumption, defined as the curve that depicts the level of
consumption across ages, has been studied in the seminal papers of Deaton and
Paxson (1994), Attanasio et al. (1999) and Gourinchas and Parker (2002), and more
recently by Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2007) and Aguiar and Hurst (2013).
The consensus view is that consumption expenditures increase with income in the
earlier part of the lifecycle, are hump-shaped, peaking around the age of 55 and
falling at the later part of the lifecycle.
When analysing lifecycle patterns of consumption, a commonly made implicit as-
sumption is that across time (waves) households of the same age behave in a similar
fashion and face similar age specific structural economic conditions. Data is thus
pooled across time. This approach may be misleading, particularly when household
unobserved heterogeneity is not accounted for. Given changes in macroeconomic and
microeconomic conditions, in the technological environment and mode of production,
in demographic structures and in the evolution of asset prices and income, the homo-
geneity assumption in consumption decisions of households of a given age across waves
needs validation and cannot be taken at face value. Hence, we relax this assumption
and show that US lifecycle nondurable consumption profiles have consistently become
flatter over time, indicating that at any given point in time and after controlling for
household characteristics, intergenerational consumption differences have declined.
We study consumption expenditures using a longitudinal panel of US households
for the period 1998-2014 that allows us to determine the age effects after controlling
for household fixed effects. First by pooling all the data and ignoring age-time vari-
ation we confirm nondurable consumption expenditures display lifecycle properties
and are hump-shaped in line with the literature (e.g. Attanasio et al. (1999) and
Aguiar and Hurst (2013)). We then allow for age and time interactions and docu-
ment that there are systematic and significant time variations in lifecycle consumption
expenditures of households in the US in the sample period we study. We show that
differences between consumption expenditures across age groups have declined and
lifecycle consumption profiles became flatter over time. Furthermore, we find that
age specific parameters of older households display more time variation, and observe
that for none of the years (waves) lifecycle profiles are hump-shaped. Thus, pooling
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data across different periods and not controlling for household fixed effects to identify
consumption profiles introduce estimation bias, mask significant and economically
relevant time variation, and may artificially generate the well known hump-shaped
lifecycle consumption profiles.
These results are robust with respect to longer longitudinal data covering the
period 1980-2014, altering the size of age groups (necessary to identify age effects when
time and age fixed effects are included), education levels, the inclusion of household
level economic controls (income and housing wealth), the exclusion of households who
do not own a house, and different ways of adjusting for family size.
Estimating the model with a standard OLS specification prevents the inclusion of
controls for the pervasive household specific unobserved heterogeneities and therefore
introduces substantial bias in the identification of lifecycle profiles as, for instance,
in the case when the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) is used. The PSID panel
data allows us to estimate the model with a fixed effects specification and thus we
address this issue, accounting for the unobserved heterogeneity in our methodology.
Nonetheless, when we estimate a OLS using CEX and PSID data we obtain similar
age profiles, indicating that the results are not driven by the potential differences
between the CEX and PSID datasets. Aguiar and Hurst (2013), using food data
from the PSID, obtain similar results estimating an OLS and a fixed effect model,
inferring that biases from the lack of fixed effects may not be relevant in this setting.
We find their conclusion cannot be extended to nondurable consumption. In the
case of nondurable consumption, controlling for household unobserved heterogeneity
is crucial to obtain unbiased empirical estimates, particularly when age and time
interactions are considered.
Aguiar and Hurst (2013) also study the lifecycle consumption of different expendit-
ure categories and find that work-related consumption expenditures, such as clothing,
transportation and food away from home decline as households get older, driving the
hump-shaped nature of consumption profiles. We observe a flattening of lifecycle con-
sumption profiles in almost all sub-categories in our sample, including work-related
categories, such as transportation and food-away, suggesting our conclusions extend
to consumption sub-categories.
The key intuition motivating our analysis is that, when studying lifecycle con-
sumption, agents of the same age at different points in time should not be treated
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as homogeneous and, as a consequence, should not be pooled together. That is
subtly distinct from taking into account cohort effects only. In fact, age profiles are
robust to the inclusion of the households’ birth year as an additional control, con-
firming constant cohort effects are not driving our results. We document that with
the systematic flattening of lifecycle consumption profiles the difference of consump-
tion across cohorts decreases through time. The appropriate interpretation therefore
is not that we identify constant cohort effects but rather that for a given cohort,
effects are systematically changing through time. These results do not imply that
35 year old households today are relatively better off than 35 year old households
in the 1990s, or that consumption inequality has changed through time, rather, the
results indicate that at each fixed point in time throughout the period we study, after
controlling for household fixed effects, the intergenerational consumption differences
have decreased. Our results, together with findings of the extensive literature that
document widening of consumption and income inequalities since 1980’s in most ad-
vanced economies (see for instance Aguiar and Bils (2015) and Hoffmann et al. (2020)
and references therein), indicate that through time the increased inequality may be
more likely explained by household specific characteristics and not by age or lifecycle
effects.
What might be behind this time variation in the consumption profiles we uncover?
Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2011) and Berger et al. (2018) stress the import-
ance of housing in shaping consumption in the lifecycle and indeed since the early
2000’s there are clear dynamic co-movements between US aggregate consumption ex-
penditures and Case-Shiller National Home Price Index. By interacting age-specific
effects with subjective house values we investigate whether housing wealth may be
driving variations in lifecycle consumption and find it not to be the case. Although,
in line with the literature, we find that changes in the subjective housing wealth signi-
ficantly affect consumption, particularly for older households, controlling for housing
does not qualitatively alter the lifecycle consumption flattening we observe.
Gourinchas and Parker (2002) stress the importance of the expected growth rate
of income in determining consumption behaviour as households age and Attanasio et
al. (1999) find that groups of households characterised by a relatively steeper income
profile also present a steeper consumption profile, indicating the evolution of income in
the lifecycle is a key driver of age-consumption profiles. After controlling for the age-
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specific component that depends on the lifecycle income, we find that consumption
profiles are no longer flattening. Higher income in the lifecycle has become strongly
associated with higher consumption levels. To confirm the relevance of time variation
in income profiles as the driver of our results, we extract the age-specific profiles
of income following the same procedure as the one applied to consumption. In line
with the work of Kambourov and Manovskii (2009) and Jeong et al. (2015), who
report changes in lifecycle earnings due a fall in the price of experience, we find very
similar patterns of time variation in income to the one we observe for consumption:
income lifecycle profiles have also become systematically flatter.1 We perform the
same robustness exercises for income, as done by consumption and find that the
systematic time variation in income persist in all cases.
In our last empirical exercise we estimate consumption and income lifecycle profiles
with panel data from the Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW)
and find similar results: age patterns for both consumption and income have been
flattening and accounting for unobserved heterogeneity alters results substantially.
Thus, the systematic time variation uncovered is not restricted to the US, but may
be a more general feature.
Finally, we provide a theoretical justification to our empirical findings. By employ-
ing a lifecycle model with consumption, housing and liquid assets choices, and feeding
the estimated changes in the age profile of income, we find that variations in lifecycle
income are sufficient to generate the observed changes in consumption profiles, con-
firming our suggestive evidence that income is driving the systematic changes in the
age profiles of consumption. We find that incorporating higher volume of credit and
house price changes do not significantly affect consumption profiles. However, only
after incorporating the changes in credit markets and the dynamics of house prices
observed from 1998 onwards the match between the theoretical lifecycle patterns of
asset holdings (housing and non-housing wealth) and the one observed in the data
improves.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Data, the econometric method-
ology and results are presented in Section 2. In Section 2.2 we present our benchmark
time-varying lifecycle results, and Section 2.3 investigates whether subjective house
1Elsby and Shapiro (2012) also report a decrease in the experience earnings profiles for low skilled
workers.
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valuation and income are behind the variation in lifecycle consumption profiles we
observe. The theoretical model is discussed in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 Empirical Evidence
We study consumption expenditure using a longitudinal panel of US households that
allows us to determine the age effects after controlling for household characteristics,
fixed effects, income and perceived housing wealth. We then consider whether age
effects depend on housing wealth and income. We start by presenting the data, then
discuss the methodology and main empirical results.
2.1 Data
Data are from the nationally representative longitudinal US household survey, the
Panel Study for Income Dynamics (PSID).2 The survey was conducted annually from
1968 to 19973 and biannually thereafter. It contains detailed information on house-
hold employment, income, consumption, assets and various household characteristics
such as health status and social behaviour of around 5000 households (about 18,000
individuals) and their descendants with the addition of new households to maintain
a nationally representative sample.4
Non-durable consumption expenditures, ci,t, is defined as the sum of imputed rent,
house insurance, utilities, nondurable vehicle costs, childcare, education costs, health
insurance, nondurable transport costs such as parking, cabs and public transport,
medical expenses, food at home, food away from home and the cash value of food
stamps.5
2An alternative data set is the CEX. In general, this is considered the gold standard of consump-
tion data in the US. The PSID is selected over the CEX because of its longitudinal structure. This
allows us to control for unobserved household effects which is not possible in the CEX. Also, we
capitalise on the expanded consumption questions introduced in the PSID in 1999. With this, the
consumption in the PSID covers 70% of the consumption measured in the CEX (Li et al. (2010)).
We show that OLS estimations using CEX or PSID data deliver similar lifecycle profiles.
3Each wave of the survey asks households about the previous year’s expenditures. We follow
convention by labelling each wave, t as time period t− 1. This means that information gathered in
the 2003 wave will be labelled in the data set as 2002.
4For a full explanation of sample selection see Appendix A.
5As is standard in the literature, these expenditures act as a proxy for consumption. In fact, it
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The benchmark sample, using data from 1998 up until 2014, capitalises on the
expanded nondurable consumption questions introduced in 1999 (data labelled 1998).
This additional information, listed above, is used to construct a full measure of non-
durable consumption. We have 42,720 observations. The average length of household
participation in the survey in this data set is 6.7 waves, with a maximum of 9 waves
(40.45 percent) and a minimum of one wave (3.3 percent). About 66.28% of house-
holds in the sample are homeowners. For robustness we repeat our analysis over a
longer time period 1980 to 2014 based on imputed data as in Attanasio and Pistaferri
(2014). We also report robustness analysis based on different methods of deflating
the consumption data as in Aguiar and Hurst (2013) and how best to adjust for
household size and composition. (see Section 2.2.1)
In some specifications we include a measure of total family income. The PSID
includes a number of measures of income and earnings. We define total family money
income Yi,t as the sum of taxable family income, family transfers and social security
benefits. Taxable family money income is the sum of the head’s asset income (di-
vidends, interest, rental income and asset income from farm business), the spouse’s
asset income, and head and spouse labour income. Family transfer income con-
sists of transfer income for family members other than husband and wife and aid to
dependent children. All income measures are deflated and scaled following the same
procedure adopted for consumption. As expected, the unconditional (log) nondurable
consumption expenditures and income for all households sorted by all ages, pooled
over the sample period 1998-2014, display clear hump-shaped profiles similar to the
ones presented in Aguiar and Hurst (2013) (See the Appendix B for details.)
Finally, in some specifications we include a measure of subjective housing wealth.
Our preferred subjective home value proxy is based on the responses of homeowners
to a question in the PSID survey and reported in housing, mortgage distress and
wealth data. Specifically homeowners are asked:
underestimates the true amount by not accounting for consumption of leisure, home production and
durable goods but assumes separable utility between these groups. Estimating the age profile over
different categories; total consumption expenditures, nondurables and durables all yield the hump
shape over the lifecycle (Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2007)). Mankiw (1982) points out
that durables and nondurables differ only in their rate of depreciation and that some nondurables,
for example, clothing, are partly durable. So if the weight of durability relates to the type of
consumption then the mix matters. Also, simply removing perceived durables is not sufficient to
exclude durability altogether.
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‘A20. Could you tell me what the present value of (your/their) (apart-
ment/mobile home/house) is (including the value of the lot if (you/they)
own the lot)–I mean about how much would it bring if (you/they) sold it
today?’
The question offers an insight into subjective expectations of households about
their perceived wealth over a 50 year time period. Household responses to this ques-
tion define our subjective variable Hi,t=Subjective Current Home Value. The average
values of Hi,t in our sample are strongly correlated (correlation coefficient: 0.96) with
the Case-Shiller House Price Index.6
2.2 Lifecycle Consumption Profiles
Our empirical model leverages the panel dimension of the dataset postulating that
the log of nondurable consumption expenditure ci,t for household i = 1, ..., N at time
t = 1998, ..., 2014 depends on a households fixed effect αi, on a set of time-varying
household characteristics,7 Zi,t, time fixed effects, D
T ime
i,t , capturing time trends or
the business cycle effects for all ages, and finally, on age effects described by a group
of dummies denoted Agei,g,t, to capture lifecycle patterns.
Additional controls for cohorts (birth year of the household head) do not alter
age consumption profiles and thus in the benchmark we select a more parsimonious
specification without year of birth effects (we discuss the role of cohort effects in more
detail below). Formally, the benchmark fixed effects specification is
ci,t = αi + βg,tAgei,g,t + δtD
T ime
i,t + ψZZi,t + εi,t (1)
Agei,g,t =
{
DAgei,g Case 1 - Pooled Lifecycle
DAgei,g ×DT imei,t Case 2 - Time-varying Lifecycle
The time effects capture the variation common to all households at each point in
6We also consider a proxy for subjective housing equity (SHE, house value net of outstanding
mortgages). Inclusion of SHE does not improve our results and are available from authors.
7These include dummy variables for the level education of the head of the household (grade school
only, high school education, incomplete university education, and a university degree or higher),
dummy variables for the number of children and adults in the household, race, marital status, state
of residence and home ownership.
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time, the household fixed effects capture the specific variation for each household
that is common across all the time periods, and finally the age effects capture the
remaining variation that is common for all households within the age group g. We
initially select 4 fifteen-years age groups g = 1, . . . , 4 (24−35, 36−50, 51−65, 65+)
to ensure each age group is well populated but also consider 10 five-years age groups,
with g = 1, . . . , 10 (24−30, ..65−70, 71+) for robustness. By considering age groups
of 5 and 15 years we avoid the traditional problem that age and time would move
in tandem and identification would not be possible. In our setting, for each wave,
the time fixed effect vary, some households move to the next age groups while others
remain, providing the necessary variation to identify age effects.
We consider two configurations for the age dependent control. In the first, denoted
Pooled Lifecycle, and in line with the literature (e.g. Aguiar and Hurst (2013)), we
assume lifecycle effects do not change over time, setting Agei,g,t = Agei,g = D
Age
i,g ,
where DAgei,g is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the age of the head of
household i is within the age group g and zero otherwise. βg,t = βg in this case
captures the log difference in mean consumption of the youngest age group (reference
group) to the other age groups across the lifecycle for the entire sample period.
In the second, denoted Time-varying Lifecycle, we account for time variation in
lifecycle consumption expenditures by setting Agei,g,t = D
Age
i,g ×DT imei,t . In this specific-
ation we allow the consumption allocations not explained by household characteristics
and business cycles effects of a age group g to potentially change with time. βg,t in
this case captures the log difference in mean consumption of the youngest age group
(reference group) to the other age groups across the lifecycle for each wave/year in
our sample.8
In Figure 1 we display the lifecycle coefficients (βg,t’s) for both specifications for
the age effect variable.9 The upper panel shows estimates for broadly defined (15
years) and lower panel for narrowly (5 years) defined age groups. The thick dark line
shows βg’s from the regression that pools the information across the entire sample to
8Note that by adding Agei,g,t = D
Age
i,g ×DTimei,t without also adding a control on D
Age
i,g separately,
we simply sum two components in computing the lifecycle consumption: the average age effects and
the time-varying component, and obtain a full representation of age specific effects on consumption.
9Table A.5 in the Appendix shows estimation results for i. the Pooled Lifecycle model, ii. the
Time-varying Lifecycle model (Benchmark) iii. Time-varying Lifecycle model with economic controls
including total family income and subjective house value as additional controls.
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measure age effects. The results are well known and depict a hump-shaped pattern of
consumption in the lifecycle. The dashed lines display the lifecycle coefficients (βg,t)
for each year (1998, . . . , 2014) separately.10 We observe a systematic time variation
in lifecycle consumption patterns. At the beginning of the sample (1998 - 2000)
consumption is increasing in age groups. With time the lifecycle profile pivots down
and towards the end of the sample period (2014) consumption is decreasing in age
groups. Our estimates show that the established hump-shaped lifecycle consumption
profile is a result of pooled data and masks significant time variations.








































































Figure 1: Lifecycle Consumption Patterns
Note: Each dashed line depicts βg,t for each year of the wave of the survey, (1998, . . . , 2014),
depicting the estimated lifecycle pattern of consumption for each year. The dark line depicts
the age effects βg when Agei,g,t pools information for the entire sample. The top graph
considers 4 age groups, while the bottom graph show the results for 10 age groups.
In Figure 2 we show the age effect coefficients and their 90% confidence interval
organised in the form of a time series (in the top panel). As such, we plot βg,t by age
group over all time periods, comparing the within age group changes across time. To
assess the significance of these changes, we test the hypothesis that the coefficients
for each age group do not change over time, formally H : βg=s,t=1998 = βg=s,t=1998+x,
which is an implicit assumption of the pooled approach. This null hypothesis is
rejected in almost all cases (results are displayed in Table 1). We thus observe that
10Although qualitatively comparable, βg’s for the pooled age effects regression (thick dark line)
are not a simple first order function of the βg,t’s estimated for each year/wave (dashed lines).
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age group coefficients, showing the relative difference w.r.t. the young age group
(24-35) for each year, are economically and statistically different from each other. In
Figure 2 (bottom panel) we present age group coefficients grouped by time. Set out
this way, these represent a sequence of lifecycle consumption profiles. This further
illustrates the decrease in slope of lifecycle consumption profiles, with older age groups
observing larger variations than the young and middle aged households. We also
compare the information criteria of the two cases for Agei,g,t, Pooled Lifecycle versus
Time-varying Lifecycle. Because the latter nests the former model, we can use the
information criteria as a likelihood ratio test with a penalty for complexity. Two
popular information criteria, AIC and BIC, favour time variation in age effects. We
also apply this test to the more granular age group specification and find strong
evidence that allowing age effects to vary with time fits that data significantly better

















































































































































































Age−Time Effects by Age and Year
Lifecycle 1998 2014: Benchmark Model
Figure 2: Age group coefficients (βg,t) plotted by age group (Top) and by year (Bottom).
Finally, we complement our lifecycle estimates for each wave by taking into account
11
Year
Age Group 2002 2006 2010 2014
35-50 0.2253 0.2871 0.0000 0.0062
51-65 0.0009 0.0097 0.0000 0.0000
>65 0.0280 0.0014 0.0000 0.0000
Table 1: βg,t - Time Variation Statistical Test
Note: We test the hypothesis that the coefficients for each age group do not change
over time. Results are shown for the base year, 1998 against 2002, 2006, 2010 and
2014, βg=s,t=1998 = βg=s,t=1998+x.
the consumption behaviour of the reference (youngest age) group (24-35), which may
be changing over time. In order to evaluate this potential business cycle effects on
the evolution of the lifecycle of the reference group we re-estimate the model where
the reference group now is 24-35 age group in 1998 (thus we drop time dummies to
avoid perfect collinearity). Figure 3 records the coefficient estimates for the young age
group w.r.t. the 1998 reference year.11 Consumption expenditures of the young age
group have in general drifted up from 1998 till 2014 (with a large fall and subsequent
recovery due to the 2008-9 crisis). The evidence presented in Figure 3 together with
Figure 2 suggests that lifecycle consumption expenditure evolution has at least two
dimensions. One is related to the shifts in the consumption behaviour of the young
age group with respect to the business cycle; the other relates to the systematic
shifts in the consumption behaviour of older age groups with respect to the young.
Another potential interpretation is that the interaction term between age and time
reflects the differential effects of the business cycles on each age group. However, if
that were to be the case, we should observe a substantial shift in the lifecycle profiles
during the great recession (2008), in a similar fashion to the movement observed in
Figure 3. Instead, our evidence points to slow moving and more systematic shifts in
lifecycle profiles, indicating the more plausible interpretation is that the relationship
between consumption levels across age groups has been structurally changing in the
last decades.
We conclude that the hump-shaped lifecycle patterns as reported by Attanasio et
al. (1999) and Aguiar and Hurst (2013) among others may be a product of pooling
that considers lifecycle profiles as being time invariant. We show lifecycle consumption
profiles have systematically shifted over the years and thus pooling the data across
all households in sample masks changes in the lifecycle behaviour of age groups over


















































24−35 Age Group: Age−Time Coefs w.r.t. 1998 Wave (Benchmark)
Figure 3: Consumption Drifts in Age Group 24-35
Two aspects of our methodology are important to interpret our results: the first
relates to unobserved household heterogeneity and the second relates to the role of
cohort effects.
Importance of Unobserved Heterogeneity: Our benchmark model takes advantage
of the panel dimension of the PSID and estimates lifecycle consumption controlling
for household fixed effects (αi). An alternative approach (see for instance Aguiar
and Hurst (2013)) is to estimate the model by OLS when using cross-sectional data
such as the CEX. However, ever since the seminal work by Mundlak (1978), it is well
known that by estimating with the OLS one cannot control for household unobserved
heterogeneity and thus the covariance between age (Ageit) and αi may introduce
biases in the lifecycle profiles (βg’s) estimated. Both Case 1 - Pooled Lifecycle and
Case 2 - Time-varying Lifecycle, can be estimated by OLS. We re-estimate both cases
this way and compare our results with the benchmark fixed effect (FE) model. First,
we find that for both the Pooled and Time-varying models, the information criteria
strongly favour the fixed effects (FE) approach (reported in the Appendix, Table A.3).
Second, inspecting the values of the estimated βg’s over the lifecycle from the FE and
OLS estimations reveals significant differences (reported in the Appendix, Figures A.5
and A.7). The OLS lifecycle profiles are very sensitive to the set of household controls
included, particularly, house ownership that introduces a level effect and employment
13
status, which affects the shape of the profile at the retirement age portion. The
fixed effect model produces stable age profiles independent of the set of controls, and
thus generates robust estimates of the age component of consumption. Finally, we
find that the OLS time-varying estimates no longer exhibit such a clear systematic
variation as obtained in the benchmark model.
Aguiar and Hurst (2013) using food data in the PSID12 find little difference
between OLS and FE models and conclude unobserved household effects may be
safely excluded when estimating lifecycle consumption profiles. Non-durable con-
sumption includes a broader range of spending categories (not available before 1999)
for which household unobserved heterogeneity appears to be more relevant. Our res-
ults indicate that for nondurable consumption, not controlling for these fixed effects
introduces biases to the age parameters. This suggests that the assumption that OLS
and FE are equivalent cannot be extended to non-food consumption.
Cohort Effects: We hypothesise that the age related consumption profile of a 40
year old in 1998 is not the same as a 40 year old in 2008. This may be interpreted as
recognising that some features of lifetime consumption are specific to the year of birth,
requiring the inclusion of controls for cohort effects in the empirical model. Because we
are estimating age effects we have the well known problem that cohort+ age = year,
and thus age and cohort effects become business cycle effects. We employ the Deaton
and Paxson (1994) method to accommodate all three controls and test the goodness
of fit of our benchmark model.
We find that having time controls and our Ageigt dummies provide a better fit,
according to information criteria, than additionally including cohort dummies. In
fact, in our specification tests, estimated constant cohort effects are found to be not
significant. As the model already controls for household time varying controls and
unobserved household average effects, and that the Ageigt dummies nest the constant
cohort effects, we find that the characteristics that are specific to the year of birth are
not a relevant driver of consumption. Standard cohort dummies will only pick up the
average effects of the year of birth over an entire lifecycle whereas the βgt coefficients
estimate the consumption of a cohort in each point in time; our framework allows the
cohort effects to change over the lifecycle. Hence, our methodology uncovers time-
variation in relative consumption levels across cohorts and not constant cohort effects
12A fuller measure of consumption was not introduced in the PSID until 1999.
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(See Appendix B.3 for details).
2.2.1 Robustness
In this section, we verify the robustness of our results. As mentioned in the previous
section, we contrasted the OLS and FE models, finding that accounting for unobserved
household heterogeneity alters results significantly, while we find that constant cohort
effect do not alter our results. Furthermore, we conduct the following robustness
exercises.
Comparison with Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX): The CEX is used in many
papers we reference and is generally agreed to provide the gold standard consump-
tion data in the US. However, it is cross sectional (households remain for maximum
four quarters) and this rules out controlling for unobserved household level effects.
Nonetheless, we reproduce our results using CEX whenever possible. First we re-
estimate the pooled model, case 1, equation 1 with OLS using the CEX and PSID
data using comparable observable household characteristics (see the Appendix C for
details). Figure 4 plots the resulting age group coefficients (re-scaled to adjust for
level effects13). The age profiles are similar, the correlation between the coefficients is
0.82. The time varying model, equation case 2, 1, is also estimated by OLS over both
data sets. Although the PSID age profiles are a little noisier, they are qualitatively
similar; we see the repeated hump shaped lifecycle shapes for both samples. These
results indicate that nondurable consumption data in the PSID and CEX have similar
lifecycle properties. Thus, we conclude the results presented here are not driven by
the potential differences between the PSID and the CEX datasets.
Long Sample: We estimate Equation (1) over a longer sample using an imputed
nondurable consumption variable, 1980 - 2014.14 Whilst the imputation process in-
troduces uncertainty, the results show that the flattening of lifecycle consumption
profiles has been occurring since 1980 (see Figure A.11 in the Appendix).15
13The difference is scale is due to the fact that the CEX data are recorded quarterly and the PSID
reports annual figures.
14The imputation method follows Blundell et al. (2008), see the Appendix for details.
15As a further check we estimate the model over food data from 1980 - 2014; data on food have
been recorded in almost every wave of the PSID since 1968. Time variation in lifecycle profiles are
also present. Results from the estimation with consumption of food are available from the authors
upon request.
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Figure 4: Log consumption over the lifecycle by age group, for the CEX and PSID. Estimated by
OLS. The PSID and CEX have been rescaled for comparison.
5 Year Age Groups: we re-estimate the benchmark model with 10 age groups,
g = 1, . . . , 10 (24 − 30, ..65 − 70, 71+)). The systematic changes in consumption
lifecycle patterns remain the same, thus averaging the behaviour of households across
larger age groups does not alter the main conclusions derived from our empirical
evidence. Results are displayed in Figure A.9 in the Appendix.
Controlling for Average Income and Subjective House Values: we estimate the
model controlling for household’s income (yi,t) and household’s subjective value of
housing Hi,t or similarly subjective net home equity(Economic Controls). The modi-
fied econometric model is
ci,t = αi + βgtAgei,gt + γyyi,t + γHHi,t + δtD
T ime
i,t + ψZZi,t + εi,t (2)
The time variation in lifecycle consumption patterns is unchanged. Results are dis-
played in Figure A.12 in the Appendix. We also re-estimate the model using only
homeowners. Results remain qualitatively similar.
Consumption Sub-categories: by studying the pooled Consumer Expenditures Sur-
vey (CEX) data for the period of 1980-2003, Aguiar and Hurst (2013) show that the
lifecycle consumption behaviour for different subcategories are quite distinct. Their
findings suggest that possible work-related consumption expenditures, such as cloth-
ing, transportation and food away, decline more significantly as households get older.
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We re-estimate our benchmark model for 9 consumption subcategories in the PSID
data (Figure A.13 in the Appendix displays the resulting age-time coefficient estim-
ates). We observe a flattening of lifecycle consumption profiles in almost all sub-
categories in our sample, including for the work-related categories, such as transport-
ation and food-away. Thus, our conclusions extend to consumption sub-categories.
Education: the composition of education levels within the population has been
changing in the past decades and therefore the time variation we observe could be
related to composition effects. To test for this possibility we estimate the lifecycle
model for sub-samples of households with different levels of education (i. the grade
school only (9.8% of the sample), ii. with high school education (26.9%), iii. some in-
complete university education (27.1%) and iv. a university degree or higher (36.1%)).
We find that lifecycle time variation occurs irrespective of the education levels. How-
ever the observed flattening of lifecycle consumption behaviour is most pronounced
by those who have at least high school education. (See Figure A.14 in the Appendix.)
Scaling: we verify the robustness to different ways to adjust for family size, and
to deflate consumption expenditures as described in St Aubyn (2018). In the bench-
mark model we include dummies for number of adults and children but also scaled
consumption to reflect family size following Blundell et al. (1994). We estimate the
model without scaling, including dummies only, and with scaling but excluding dum-
mies, the main qualitative results are robust to these changes. We test the robustness
to different methods of deflation and find that our results are not driven by our choice
of using expenditure category specific price indexes. (for details see Appendix B.1).
Family Composition: although results are robust to different scaling methodo-
logies, changes in family composition may be endogenous, potentially introducing
selection bias. We re-estimate our model including only stable households (the ones
where the head or the spouse did not change). Results once again are qualitatively
unaffected. (See Figure A.15)
Panel versus Cross-sectional Estimation: our model makes use of the panel dimen-
sion of the data to control for household fixed effects and average (across the sample
period) effects of the time varying household characteristics (Zit). An alternative is to
estimate the model ci = δ+βgAgeig +ψzZi + vi for each wave, obtaining a set of βg’s
for each wave (t) independently. This model no longer controls for household fixed
effects but does allow ψz to vary across time (see Equation 1). By information criteria
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the preferred approach for estimation is still fixed effects estimation of Equation 1.
Results are shown in Appendix B.6.
2.3 Lifecycle Consumption: The Role of the Income and
Housing
We document systematic and significant time variation in the profiles of lifecycle con-
sumption expenditures in the US. Lifecycle consumption profiles have consistently
become flatter through time. What may be behind this time variation in the con-
sumption profiles we uncover?
Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2011) stress the importance of housing in-
vestment in shaping consumption in the lifecycle and indeed for most households
investment in a house (typically purchased via mortgage credit) to live-in constitutes
the largest asset investment in their lifetime. Moreover, during the first part of our
sample, borrowing constraints have relaxed and house prices increased substantially
(see Favilukis et al. (2017), Kaplan et al. (2017) and Cox and Ludvigson (2018)). In
the early 2000’s there are clear dynamic co-movements between business cycle com-
ponents of US aggregate consumption expenditures and the Case-Shiller National
Home Price Index (which itself is found to be closely linked, at the aggregate level,
to our measure of housing wealth, see the Appendix for detail). Thus, our first vari-
able of interest is the time variation in housing wealth. Although many contributions
have looked at the effects of housing wealth in consumption, most have focused on
the marginal propensity to consume due to changes in housing wealth (e.g. Carroll
et al. (2011), Aladangady (2017), Berger et al. (2018)). In contrast, our interest is
in the role of housing in the lifecycle variations of consumption expenditures across
generations.
Gourinchas and Parker (2002) stress the importance of the expected growth rate
of income in determining consumption behaviour as households age and Attanasio
et al. (1999) find that groups of households characterised by a relatively steeper
income profile also present a steeper consumption profile, indicating that the shape
the income in the lifecycle is a key driver of age-consumption profiles. Although we
have introduced the level of current income into our benchmark model, showing the
results are unaffected, relative changes of income across age groups may be relevant
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in altering the age pattern of consumption. Therefore, our second object of interest
is the lifecycle variations in income across generations.
In order to extract the role of variations in income and housing wealth across
the lifecycle on consumption profiles we allow the age-time specific components in
consumption expenditures not related to household characteristics to vary depending
on our variable(s) of interest, namely, household’s total family income and subject-
ive housing value. We thus add to our benchmark specification interaction dummies
Agei,g,tXi,t, that incorporate a variable Xi,t ∈ {Yi,t, Hi,t} next to our age-time dum-
mies.
Formally, the econometric model (denoted the Interaction model) is
ci,t = αi + θg,tAgei,g,t + θg,X,tAgei,g,tXi,t + δtD
T ime
i,t + ψ1Zi,t + εi,t (3)
To assess the relevance of each of the variable of interest in driving the time
variation we can decompose the age-time effects as follows
βg,t = θg,t + θg,X,t. (4)
As such, age-time dummies (θg,t) aim to capture age specific variation in consumption
expenditures that cannot be explained by age specific time-variation in our variable
of interest (total family income or subjective house value) while θg,X,t reflect the
contributions of income or housing on the lifecycle consumption profiles.
We report the results in Figures 5 (a) for subjective housing value and 5 (b) for
total family income.16 The top panels depict the age-time coefficient estimates for the
benchmark model and the Interaction model by age group, over all time periods. The
bottom panels plot the three-way estimates, θg,X,t, depicting the relevance of housing
and income in shaping lifecycle consumption patterns.17
16In the Appendix (Table A.6) we provide a full description of the estimation results for benchmark
and interaction models. i. Time-varying Lifecycle model (Benchmark) ii. Three-way interaction
model with Subjective House Value (Interaction SHV model), iii. Three-way interaction model with
Total Family Income and finally (Interaction: TFI model) iv. Three-way interaction model with
Subjective House Value and Total Family Income jointly (Joint SHV and TFI model). We report
coefficient estimates for age-time dummies as well as estimates for all other controls together with
AIC and BIC information criteria.
17In both cases the top panels have two y axis to help make visual comparisons between the age





















Life Cycle 1998-2014: Benchmark and Interaction Models































































(b) Interaction Model - Total Family Income
Figure 5: Age group coefficients: Benchmark Model (Equation 2) and Interaction Model (Equation
3). Top Panel (a) and (b): βg,t from Equation 2 (blue - dash line) and θg,t from Equation 3 (red);
Bottom Panel (a) and (b): θg,X,t, Equation 3
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First, the role of housing in shaping the lifecycle profile of consumption seems min-
imal. From the top panel, we still observe the same time-varying lifecycle behaviour of
each age group when we control for age-time specific house valuation; βg,1998− βg,2014
and θg,1998 − θg,2014 are nearly the same and thus variations in house wealth are not
behind the flattening of consumption profiles. The bottom panel shows that θg,H,t
are generally small, particular for the first 2 age groups. Therefore, high subjective
house values seems to sustain consumption particularly for the older households and
after the first half of 2000’s. Housing wealth seems to be wealth only towards the end
of lifecycle and after the 2008 correction (see Buiter (2010)).
In contrast, lifecycle variations in income are more relevant in shaping the changes
we observe in consumption profiles. First, from the top panel, in the benchmark model
βg,1998 − βg,2014 increases with age, while after controlling for income θg,1998 − θg,2014
is fairly constant with age. Thus, after extracting the age-specific component that
depend on income, lifecycle consumption are no longer flattening (the only time vari-
ation left is a level effect, diametrically opposed to the increasing positive effect of
income in driving the age-profile of consumption). Second, θg,H,t increases, indicat-
ing that higher income in the lifecycle has become strongly associated with higher
consumption levels.
2.4 Time Variation in Lifecycle Income
Our findings so far suggest a close association between time-variation in lifecycle
consumption an income. Therefore before we proceed to our theoretical exercise,
we complement our lifecycle consumption analysis by presenting detailed patterns in
lifecycle income itself. We re-estimate the benchmark model for total family income
instead of consumption, extracting the age-specific path of income for each year (βYg,t).




i,g ×DT imei,t ) + δtDT imei,t + ψZZi,t + εi,t. (5)
Our lifecycle income results are displayed in Figures 6 and 7. Indeed we observe
a very similar pattern of time variation in income than the one we observe for con-
the same y axis to aid in the comparison of the role of housing and income in influencing lifecycle
consumption.
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sumption. After controlling for observable household characteristics, the age-profile
of income has also flattened, with the difference in income across ages decreasing
to the point that in 2014 younger households had a higher age-specific total family
income than their older counterparts. We perform the same estimation using labour
income instead of total family income and find that the lifecycle income flattening
pattern also emerges (See Figure A.17 in the Appendix). Our findings are in line
with Kambourov and Manovskii (2009) who report flattening of life-cycle earnings
profiles for successive cohorts of male workers entering the labor market in the 1970s
and 1980s and related to findings in Jeong et al. (2015) that the lifecycle income
(and associated wage premium) flattening may be related to changes in demographic
structure. Elsby and Shapiro (2012) also report a decrease in the experience earnings
profiles for lower skilled workers. We perform the same robustness exercises as done
for consumption and find similar results, the flattening of age profiles occur in all
specifications (see the Appendix for details). Note again that our results do not im-
ply 35 year old households 2014 are relatively worse off than 35 year old households
in the 1998, rather, the results indicate that at each fixed point in time throughout
the sample, intergenerational income differences, after fixed effects are accounted for,
have decreased in both income and consumption.








































































Figure 6: Lifecycle Income Patterns
Note: Each dashed line depicts βg,t for each year of the wave of the survey, (1998, . . . , 2014),
depicting the estimated lifecycle pattern of consumption for each year. The dark line depicts
the age effects βg when Agei,g,t pools information for the entire sample. The top graph









































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 7: Total Family Income: Age group coefficients (βYg,t) plotted by age group by year. Left -
4 age groups, Right - 10 age groups.
2.5 Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW)
The results presented so far rely on two modifications to the standard approach for
estimating consumption over the lifecycle. First controlling for household fixed effects
and, second, allowing consumption to vary by age and time rather than pooling data
by age over all periods. We show that in the PSID, both of these adjustments have
an impact on the lifecycle profile. To investigate whether our results are US specific,
we take the model to an alternative panel data set, the Italian Survey of Household
Income and Wealth (SHIW). SHIW does not capture every variable we have in the
PSID, however key variables align well with those in the PSID and are sufficient
for our purposes. To replicate the structure of the PSID data used in estimation as
closely as possible we drop observations before 1998. 18
The SHIW results confirm that the difference between OLS and FE and between
constant and time varying age profiles are not peculiar to the PSID. Figure 8 depicts
18Household characteristics are well aligned with the PSID. These are geographical location, re-
tirement status, employment status, educational attainment, marital status, home ownership status.
The data are scaled according to household size and composition with the SHIW OECD variable.
We also include dummies for number of children and number of adults in the household. Data are
deflated as with PSID. Notation for the SHIW variables is consistent with the one used in the rest
of the paper. Note also that for the sub sample we use, 28791 households participate in the survey
only once. These are dropped from the sample because they will be lost in the demeaning of the
fixed effects adjustment. However, the OLS results, where they will not be dropped, are not changed
in any meaningful way by the exclusion of these households. This accounts for the different number
of observations in the estimation approach when OLS and FE are compared.
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the age profiles for pooled model by OLS and FE, OLS give a stronger hump shape
over the lifecycle with a peak of the hump in the 50-55 age group. For fixed effects,
we observe a flatter profile over the lifecycle, but still displaying the same hump-
shape pattern. Results for the time-varying FE model for Italian household panel are
set out in Figure 9(a) for consumption and Figure 9(b) for income. In both cases we
uncover a similar flattening of lifecycle profiles from 1998 to 2012. In 2014 the pattern
reverses indicating that for the post-crises the economic conditions of the young in
Italy have not been recovering as well as they did in the US (see Glover et al. (2020)
for the intergenerational effects of the crisis in the US). In short, the SHIW results










































Figure 8: Italian SHIW data: the pooled model. Consumption is the dependent variable. The





































































































Log Disposable Income.  Plots by Year; 1998 − 2016
(b) Income
Figure 9: Italian SHIW data: the time varying FE model
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3 Lifecycle Model
We now present a theoretical model to gain understanding of the roles housing wealth,
credit and income fluctuations may play in driving lifecycle consumption and asset
choices. We develop a dynamic, incomplete markets model of household lifecycle
consumption similar to the one in Berger et al. (2018). Time is discrete, we set one
period of the model to correspond to one year. Population is constant, households
enter the economy, work for Jw years, retire and live for another Jr years. A household
thus lives for J = Jw + Jr years. Working households face uninsurable idiosyncratic
income risk and invest in two assets: a risk-free asset paying a constant interest rate
r, and housing. We denote the holdings of each asset by household i at time t as,
respectively, ai,t and hi,t.





βU(ci,t+j, si,t+j) + β
J+1B(Bi,t+J+1)
]
where ci,t+j is nondurable consumption, si,t+j housing services and Bi,t+J+1 = ai,t(1+
r) + (1− δ)Pi,t+J+1hi,t+J are bequests.
Households are allowed to go short the risk-free asset but must abide by a bor-
rowing constraint. We assume a fraction θ of the current value of owned houses and
a fraction φ of current income (yit) can be pledged as collateral. Thus, household’s
asset position must satisfy the borrowing constraint
ai,t > −(θPi,thi,t + φyit)
.
Working household’s income is given by yit = exp(ν(agei,t) + zi,t), where ν(agei,t)
is a known age-dependent term and zi,t is a transitory shock that follows an AR1
process. Retirement income is fixed and is assumed to be a function of the income in
the last working-age period.
Houses are traded at prices Pi,t.
19 We assume house prices follow a geometric
19Although we include the subscript i, since in our model households may experience different
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random walk with a drift Pi,t = xtPi,t−1, where ln(xt) ∼ N(µP , σP ). µP thus denotes
the trend growth rate of house prices. Households who trade houses must pay an
transaction cost ΞPthi,t. Owned houses yield a per-period service equals to ωhi,t,
ω > 1, and carry a maintenance cost of δPi,thi,t that fully offsets physical depreciation.
Households that decide not to own a house can rent it paying a rental cost of φPt
for each unit of housing (the price-rent ratio is constant). Rented houses yield a
per-period service equal to hi,t, thus owned houses deliver higher services.
At any time t, the household state is fully described by the vector x ≡ (a, h, z, P, age)
given by the liquid asset, housing, income shock, house prices and age. Households
face four possible scenarios: (i) household becomes a renter (R), selecting current
housing from the set HR and have no house holdings to carry for the next period; (ii)
households that own a house may decide to refinance (F ), increasing their borrow-
ing and keeping house holdings hi,t constant, paying a refinancing cost of ΞRfPi,thi,t;
(iii) household maintains house holdings constant and pays amortization or reduces
borrowing (N); and (iv) household is an owner and alters housing stock at time t, or
it was a renter in the last period and becomes an house owner (T ), selecting housing
from the set H.
Therefore, the value of expected utility of the household is
V (x) = max{V R, V F , V N , V T},
where, the value function for each scenario is given by
realisations of house prices, these are the prices for the existing house of household i as well as the
newly transacted house and in that sense reflect an aggregate shock from the perspective of the
household (See Berger et al. (2018)).
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Renting Trading Houses
V R(x)=maxc,a′,h′ u(c,s)+Et[β(V (x′)|z,P ] V T (x)=maxc,a′,h′ u(c,s)+Et[βV (x′)|z,P ]
s.t. c+a′+φPh′6y+a(1+r)+(1−Ξ−δ)Ph s.t. c+a′+Ph′6y+a(1+r)+(1−Ξ−δ)Ph
a′>φy, s=h′, x’=(a′,0,z′,P ′,age+1) a′>(θPh+φy), s=ωh′, x’=(a′,h′,z′,P ′,age+1)
h′∈HR h′∈H
Refinancing No Housing Adjustment
V F (x)=maxc,a′ u(c,s)+Et[β(V (x′)|z,P ] V N (x)=maxc,a′ u(c,s)+Et[β(V (x′)|z,P ]
s.t. c+a′+6y+a(1+r)+(−δ−ΞRf )Ph s.t. c+a′+6y+a(1+r)+(−δ)Ph
a′>(θPh+φy), s=ωh, x’=(a′,h,z′,P ′,age+1) s=ωh, x’=(a′,h,z′,P ′,age+1)
a′>[amort a if a<0 , 0= if a>0]
Parameterizations








Households enter the economy with 25 year of age, work for 35 years (Jw), retire and
live an additional 20 years (Jr). We set the coefficient of relative risk aversion σ to 2
and the interest rate to 2.4%.
As in Berger et al. (2018), we calibrate the house price process by setting µP =
0.012 and σP = 0.046 to match the annual standard deviation and real growth rate of
aggregate house prices in FHFA data from 1990 until 2019. We choose a depreciation
rate of housing δ = 2.2 to match the depreciation rate in BEA data from 1960 to
2014. The collateral constraints parameter θ determines the minimum mortgage down
payment, and we choose a value of 0.8 in our baseline calibration. The ratio of non-
collateral debt and income in Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) in 1998 is around
25% we thus set φ = 0.25. We set Ξ=0.05. This transaction cost is equal to the value
of housing adjustment costs calibrated in Dı́az and Luengo-Prado (2010).
The working age income process has an age-dependent and a transitory compon-
ent. Following Floden and Linde (2001), the temporary component z follows an AR1
process with autocorrelation ρz = 0.91 and standard deviation σz = 0.21 to match
PSID earnings statistics (after removing age-dependent components). We calibrate
the model using the age dependent component of income estimated for 1998, de-
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noted ν(age98) and depicted in Figure 7. Finally, households receive a social security
payment of forty percent of their labour income prior to retirement.
Rented and owned housing are selected within the sets HR = [0, HRmax] and
H = [Hmin, Hmax], respectively, where HRmax < Hmax. Thus, owned houses
cannot be too small and rented houses are in general smaller than owned houses.
Hmax is set such that households are not constrained in choosing big houses.
Parameters, HRmax, Hmin, and α, which controls the share of housing in the
utility, β, the discount factor, ψ and B̄, which control the bequests, ω, which controls
the added utility of house ownership, and φ, which controls the rental price, are calib-
rated to match the ratio of the average earnings of owners to renters of 2.1 (1998 SCF)
and the lifecycle profiles of housing wealth, non-housing wealth and homeownership
in the 1998 SCF data, following a similar procedure as in Berger et al. (2018). We
compute average housing wealth and average liquid wealth net of debt for households
in nine age groups (25-29, 30-34,. . ., 60-64, 65 and over). Housing wealth comprises
primary residence and other residential and nonresidential real state. Liquid wealth
net of debt is the sum of cash, money market, checking, savings and call accounts
and holdings of mutual funds, stocks and bonds net of credit cards and mortgages
(we only have one asset in the model).20 For retired households (above the age of 60
years) we also include retirement accounts. In the model, payments from retirement
accounts take the form of a lump sum transfer at retirement and a pension annuity,
which within our calibration procedure are set, respectively, as fractions ϑ0 and ϑpa
of the labour income prior to retirement.
Finally, a household enters the economy at 25 years of age with an amount of
housing, liquid assets and income such that we match the distribution of age 20-30
year old households in the 1998 SCF. Based on our calibration procedure, α, β, ψ,
B̄, ω, φ, ϑ0, ϑpa, Hmin and HRmax are:
20To normalise data and model we divide both measures of wealth by average income of working
age households.
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α β ψ B̄ ω φ ϑ0 ϑpa Hmin HRmax
0.165 0.9375 2 1.4 1.18 0.05 1.2 0.35 0.1 0.75
Table 2: Parameter Values
As in Berger et al. (2018), the model does a good job in matching the SCF asset
holdings data.21 The lifecycle profiles of housing wealth, non-housing wealth and
homeownership in the data and model are shown in Figure A.22 in Appendix H.
Time Variation in Lifecycle Consumption Profiles
Our empirical results suggest the key driver of the flattening of lifecycle consump-
tion profiles is the change in the lifecycle income profiles. Our benchmark model
incorporates the age dependent component of income estimated for 1998, denoted
ν(age98). As our empirical results show the age dependent component of income has
been consistently changing from 1998 to 2014, with the difference of total income
across age groups decreasing as time passes. We obtain from our estimation two ad-
ditional age-dependent component curves, one for 2006, ν(age06), and one for 2014,
ν(age14) and re-simulate the model using different age dependent income profiles.
First, although not part of our calibration, the model does a good job in matching
the age profile of consumption observed in 1998. Second, by only changing the age
component of income ν(age) we can assess the role of changing income profiles on
lifecycle consumption in our model economy. Results are displayed in Figure 10. In
all cases we depict the invariant lifecycle profiles for which the age income profiles
differ but average income remains constant. The theoretical results confirm the em-
pirical evidence that changes in income profiles are crucial to explain the decrease
in the difference of consumption across households of different ages observed in the
data. The model is able to match the estimated flattening in consumption profiles
reasonably well.
Next we focus on the role of interest rates, credit and housing market dynamics
on consumption profiles. From 1998 till 2006 debt to income has increased by 40%
21In order to solve the model we select a grid of 50 points for assets and housing. To incorpor-
ate trend in house prices we solve the model such that household select housing wealth Pi,thi,t,
discounting the continuation value in the Bellman equation by the expected trend in house prices
(see Berger et al. (2018) for further details). Invariant lifecycle measures are calculated after we
simulated lifecycle decisions for 10000 households.
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Figure 10: Consumption Life Cycle Profiles: Model with different income profiles versus Estimation
Note: For each model simulation we use either the income profiles ν(age98) - Calibration, ν(age06) or ν(age14)
obtained from the estimation (5) - (lines with circles). Data comes from the benchmark estimation of age profiles
of consumption (βg,t).
(Using data from SCF 1998 and 2007). As we mentioned above, several contributions
highlight the importance of relaxed credit constraints during this period. House prices
(FHFA data) from 1990 until 2006 increase on average 2.3% as opposed the 1.2%,
our calibrated figure, which relies on data until 2019. Finally, several contributions
highlight that in the last decades the equilibrium real rate of interest has consistently
fallen (see for instance Aksoy et al. (2019) and Del Negro et al. (2019)). To account
for these changes in economic conditions from 1998 till 2006 as potential drivers for
the movements in consumption profiles we (i) increase the trend in house prices to
µP = 0.023, (ii) relax credit constraints (a 10% increase in θ - using the SCF of 1998
and 2007, leverage ratios of new house buyers increase by 10% from 1998 till 2007)
and (iii) decrease interest rates by 100 basis points. Results are shown in Figure 11.
Relaxed credit constraints and lower interest rates imply households borrow more
and bring consumption forward, flattening lifecycle profiles. Higher trends in house
prices imply home owners become richer during the lifecycle and consumption profiles
become steeper. Overall, consumption profiles are not as significantly affected by the
level of interest rates, credit and housing market changes as they do when the age
component of income changes.
Time Variation in Assets Holdings and Housing Values
Although the change in the income profiles are sufficient to produce the changes
in consumption profiles, we cannot generate the asset accumulation changes observed
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Figure 11: Consumption Life Cycle Profiles: Impact of Credit and House Prices
Note: Model ν(age98) - Benchmark, Model - Credit, incorporates relaxation in credit constraints in the
Benchmark Calibration, Model - Credit/Housing, incorporates both the relaxation in credit constraints
and the increase in the trend in house prices and Model - Low IR, lowers interest rates in the Benchmark
Calibration. Estimation (dash line) comes from the benchmark model of lifecycle consumption for 1998
(βg,1998)
during the same period. Nonetheless, comparing the lifecycle profiles of housing
wealth, non-housing wealth and homeownership in the 2007 SCF and the profiles
from the theoretical model incorporating income changes only and income and house
prices/credit changes, we show that combining both the changes in income profile
and incorporating the changes in the trend in house prices and the relaxation of
credit constraints improves the match between data and model both in the changes
in consumption profiles and the changes in asset holdings before the Great Recession.
Results are reported in Figure A.23 in Appendix H.
In the aftermath of the Great Recession, credit constraints tightened and house
prices fell substantially, recovering after 2010. In fact, the average growth rate of
house prices from 2007 to 2019 (FHFA data) is close to 0%. To account for these
changes in economic conditions since 2007 as potential drivers for the movements
in asset holdings we decrease the trend in house prices to µP = 0, and tightens
credit constraints (θ = 0.5 and φ = 0.15) and compare the asset profiles from the
simulated model with the SCF 2013 data (see Figure A.24 in Appendix H). Once
again, including only income changes imply simulated asset profiles do not match the
data. Incorporating changes in credit and house market conditions help the model in
matching asset holdings, although we find the age profile of liquid assets under the new
income profile portray a much stronger desire to save during the lifecycle as income is
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no longer expected to increase with age. In all cases we depict the invariant lifecycle
profiles from the theoretical model. As such, as we compare different simulations
all the adjustment/transition process has already occurred. Stock variables such as
housing wealth and liquid assets may vary slowly in the data and thus the changes
in income profiles we contemplate might take time to affect them. That could be a
reason why the model is able to match consumption profiles more closely than the
asset lifecycle profiles.
4 Conclusions
We study the evolution of lifecycle consumption patterns using US panel data. We
empirically show that hump-shaped lifecycle profiles of US consumption expenditures
are an artefact of pooling data across years from an entire sample and not controlling
for household fixed effects. When we account for age time interactions not only the
hump-shaped profile disappears but we also document clear time varying trends in
lifecycle consumption patterns that are robust to a battery of changes in data, in
specification and the introduction of additional controls on household characteristics
and economic variables. While analysing the potential drivers of this time variation
we find that variation in subjective house wealth in the lifecycle do not seem to affect
consumption profiles. In contrast, lifecycle income profiles have shown the same time
variation and may be behind the systematic variation in consumption we uncover.
A lifecycle model of consumption, housing and liquid asset choice shows that indeed
changes in lifecycle income profiles are able to generate the observed change in lifecycle
consumption patterns. Changes in credit availability and house price dynamics have
a much less pronounced effect on consumption in the lifecycle. Nonetheless, in order
to also match asset and housing choice, one need to incorporate both changes in
income and in housing and credit dynamics. Overall, our results do not imply 35
year old households today are relatively better off than 35 year old households in the
1990s, or that inequality has been changing across time, rather, the results indicate
that at each fixed point in time throughout the last decades, the differences across
generations have decreased in both income and consumption. Consumption profiles
are subject to time variations that can also be interpreted as the result of changes in
cohort effects through time.
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Our findings complement extensive literature who document widening of overall
US and other advanced economies consumption and income inequalities since 1980’s
(see for instance Aguiar and Bils (2015) and Hoffmann et al. (2020) and references
therein). We suggest that observed increase in consumption/income disparities are
accompanied by a systematic decline in intergenerational consumption/income dis-
parities and thus may be associated with household specific characteristics rather
than age or lifecycle effects.
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1. We begin with household heads of the entire Survey, that is 1968 - 2014; there are
270,578 observations. The initial motivation for the PSID was the study of low
income households. This original survey is identified as the Survey for Economic
Opportunity (SEO). The Survey Research Centre (SRC) later introduced a
sample drawn from all income groups and representative of the population.
This is the known as the SRC survey and a sample initially of 2,930 households
made up this group. In 1990 a new cohort was added to the sample to correctly
represent the level of Mexican, Cuban, and Puerto Rican immigrants in the
population. Households with income less that zero (64) are dropped. All the
variables in the sub sample are truncated at the top and bottom. We convert
variables on the truncation boundary to missing. Also heads younger than 25
and older than 80 are dropped. Obvious outliers for food at home, food away
from home, food stamps, rent, and from the imputed variable are dropped. The
final sub-sample comprises 102,644 observations. There are 11,534 households.
The average time in the sample is 8.3 years with a minimum of one and a
maximum of 29 years.
2. We consider two measures of housing wealth. Our preferred subjective home
value proxy is based on the responses of homeowners to a question in the PSID
survey and reported in housing, mortgage distress and wealth data. Ever since
the PSID began home-owners are asked what value they attach to their home.
Specifically homeowners are asked:
‘A20. Could you tell me what the present value of (your/their)
(apartment/mobile home/house) is (including the value of the lot
1
if (you/they) own the lot)–I mean about how much would it bring if
(you/they) sold it today?’
The question offers an insight into subjective expectations of households about
their perceived wealth over a 50 year time period. Household responses to this
question define our subjective variable Hi,t=Subjective Current Home Value.
How well do household’s subjective home values match prices in the market? In
Figure A.1 we compare average values in our sample to the Case-Shiller House
Price Index.22 The two series have a correlation coefficient in the order of 0.96.
The relationship holds across house values by income groups; house values in
the 10th, 25th, 75th and 95th percentiles have a similar correlation value to
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Figure A.1: Subjective House Value and Case Shiller Index
gregate consumption expenditures and Case-Shiller National Home Price Index
together. Causal observation suggests that as of early 2000’s there are clear dy-
namic co-movements between these two variables with episodes before and after
22This is compiled from repeat sales values of houses in the US across nine census divisions.
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Personal Consumption Expenditures Excluding Food and Energy, Monthly, SA (left scale)
S&P/Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index, Monthly, SA (right scale)
Source: FRED
Figure A.2: Business Cycle Components of Consumption and Case-Shiller House Price Index
Net Home Equity (HEi,t) defined as the difference between the subjective house
value Hi,t and the outstanding mortgage debt (MDi,t).
23The simple dynamic correlation between 12 month lagged Case-Shiller index and consumption
expenditures is in the order of 55%.
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Appendix A.1 Unconditional Lifecycle Consumption and In-
come
Figure A.3 displays unconditional (log) nondurable consumption expenditures and
income for all households and for homeowners sorted by all ages pooled over the
sample period 1998-2014 similar to the ones presented in Aguiar and Hurst (2013). We
observe a clear hump-shaped profile in both consumption expenditures and income
peaking roughly around the age of 55. Given our interest in the effect of housing
wealth in influencing lifecycle patterns we also plot the income and consumption
profile for homeowners. While homeowners do have a higher income than the overall
population and their consumption expenditures are uniformly higher, consumption
expenditures display similar statistical properties over the lifecycle as the overall
population sample.
Figure A.3: Unconditional Consumption Expenditures and Income by Age
4
Appendix A.2 Unconditional Lifecycle Consumption by Year




age=20 cit. There are no
controls for household size, composition or any other household level effects. Results
are shown in Figure A.4. The typical hump shape over the lifecycle is evident in each
of the years.
Figure A.4: The panel show mean consumption plotted by age for each year. There are no controls
on the data here.
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Appendix A.3 Imputation
We again use the PSID, but now include data from 1980 - 1998. The expanded
consumption questions were introduced in the 1999 wave. Before this the PSID con-
sistently collected information on a few consumption items: food, home rent and
utility payments. For the 1980 - 2015 analysis, we construct an imputed measure of
nondurable consumption expenditures following Attanasio and Pistaferri (2014). The
imputation approach is based on predicting non-food consumption using an approx-
imate demand system that relates consistently available consumption data (food) to
nondurable expenditures.24 A final adjustment is to drop all odd years to match
the biennial structure of the survey after 1998. The final sample consists of 71,662
observations with an average household participation length of 5 waves (or 10 years
as we retain biennial waves), a maximum of 17 (16.68 percent), and a minimum of 1
period (2.58 percent). In the long sample homeowners make up about 67.18% of the
households.
To estimate imputed nondurable consumption in the pre 1999 data we estimate a
log/levels equation by OLS. Specifically, to estimate imputed nondurable consumption
in the pre 1998 data we estimate a log/levels equation by OLS in the short sample.
nf it = Z
′




• nfi,t = ln(
∑
k Cit,k) is total nondurable, non-food expenditures, with Cit,k the
expenditure on non-food category k by household i in time t.
24Any prediction using this proxy for nondurable consumption expenditures makes assumptions
about the stability of relationships between household characteristics and expenditures that we
unfortunately cannot test. To limit uncertainty, we choose 1980 as our earliest data point.
6
• Zit is a vector of socio-economic variables in the food demand equation.
• g is a polynomial function for f , the total of food at home, away, and the
monetary value of food stamps received. These data are available for all waves
except 1981 and 1982.
• P is a vector of annual price indexes; for overall CPI, food at home and food
away from home and rent.
Imputed log total nondurable consumption for 1980 - 2014, ĉi,t is then
ĉit = log[foodc + exp(Z
′β̂ + g(fit; θ̂c) + P
′γ̂)]
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B Appendix - Specification Issues
Appendix B.1 Scaling of the Data
We investigate how best to adjust for household size and composition. Our findings
lead us to control for the number of adults and number of children with dummies and
also to use OECD equivalence scales ((Blundell et al., 1994)). We show our results
are robust to using only dummies to correct for family size as in Aguiar and Hurst
(2013).
As is well documented, family composition influences consumption. Failing to
control for family composition distorts the intertemporal pattern of consumption
and over states the relationship between consumption and income ((Blundell et al.,
1994)). Scaling for family composition explains over half of the hump shape seen in
the data over the lifecycle ((Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger, 2007)). There are
different ways of implementing these controls. One method is to scale consumption
using one of the available equivalence scales. The scales attach different weights to
adults and children and, in some cases, account for economies of scale also; two adults
do necessarily require twice the amount of everything. Each scale has benefits and
costs (Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2007))25. Another approach is to include
dummies for numbers of children and adults, or more elaborate versions of this.
(Aguiar and Hurst, 2013) have eleven dummies specifying age groups and gender of
children.
One point to note is that although it is clear that controlling for composition is
important in measuring the age profile of consumption, it does not account for the
25See http://www.oecd.org/eco/growth/OECD-Note-EquivalenceScales.pdf or (Attanasio, Banks,
Meghir and Weber, 1999).
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fact that household composition is endogenous. For example, the arrival of children
is not usually a complete surprise, nor is their departure. This information is known
somewhat in advance and so probably influences spending and savings decisions before
the econometric control appears.
In the absence of an agreed approach, we compare results from estimating Equa-
tion 1 with consumption adjusted for household composition in three different ways,
set out below. There are six cases to consider. Three for the Pooled Lifecycle model
and three for the Time-varying Lifecycle model. We take the information criteria as
a measure of best fit.
1. 20 Dummies are included in the model to allow for the number of children and
adults, but the consumption variable itself is not treated in any way. Attana-
sio et al (1995) and Aguiar and Hurst (2013) also allow for age and gender of
children.
2. OECD equivalence scales.
These are many equivalence scales to choose from but OECD scales are used
in similar work. To apply this, Ci,t is divided by the scale value, scalei,t =
1 + 0.7(ni,t − 1) + 0.5ki,t, where n is the number of adults and k the number of
children. We estimate equations with log values so
csci,t = ndci,t − ln(scalei,t)
where csci,t = log scaled nondurable consumptioni,t and ndci,t is log nondurable.
3. Consumption is adjusted by OECD scale and a full set of dummies are also
included. The motivation for this configuration is that after the log transform-
9





controls are needed to capture household composition effects.
We use information criteria to compare model fit in three cases; with dummies
only, with OECD scaling only, and with both. Adjusting consumption by OECD
scales and including separate dummies for numbers of children and adults in the
household provides the best fit. Note that this is in spite of the cost of the introduction
of 15 additional parameters. The OECD scaling applies a fixed adjustment to each
household but this obviously does not completely describe how household composition
changes affect consumption. The dummies are more flexible. We note that the model
does not account for differences in returns to scale for different expenditure categories
as in (Aguiar and Hurst, 2013) or the endogeneity of family composition.
We can test whether the scaling is correct. Define scale as Si,t =
∑
wiNi, some
weight w applied to household size and composition. Then the equation has the form
lnndci,t − ln(scale)i,t =
∑





thesis that γ = 1 is not rejected so imposing the scaling on the dependent variable
is acceptable. This equation brings out the different way that the number in each
category influences log consumption; linearly through the dummies and logarithmic-
ally through the scaling. If we plot the coefficient values by year, the effects of the
different scaling approaches on the lifecycle consumption estimations are very clear.
The less restricted approach of using dummies for number of children and number of
adults, captures household specific household composition effects left behind by the
more restrictive OECD scaling treatment. (See St Aubyn (2018) for details.)
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Appendix B.2 Deflating the Data
We compare two methods for deflating the consumption data. The first uses expendit-
ure category specific price indices in order to account for relative price variations and
is applied in the short data set. The second more commonly used method utilises the
simple CPI across all expenditure categories. We use CPI to deflate the long data set
that is imputed. This is because we do not impute category by category, but by the
aggregated nondurable consumption variable. For the short data set, we show that
results are robust to either deflation method.
In general, consumption data are deflated for lifecycle analysis by a measure such
as overall CPI, or a weighted average of price indices. But some work Aguiar and
Hurst (2013) deflates by price indexes specific to spending category. We check the
impact of deflation approach by these two methods on lifecycle consumption and find
it has only a small affect on the outcome (See St Aubyn (2018) for details.)
11
Appendix B.3 Cohort Effects
When measuring the age profile of consumption, controls should be included for cohort
effects and business cycle effects. The first recognises that some features of lifetime
consumption influences are specific to year of birth. The second, picks up shocks that
affect the whole population but in a particular time period.
The difficulty here is that cohort+age = year. Deaton and Paxson (1994) devised
a method to make the columns of the time dummies sum to zero, thus making them
orthogonal to the year effects, t. This is a popular approach and is adopted in much
of the literature. 26 We define the orthogonalised dummies, d∗t in the model instead of
the standard time dummies Dt. Jappelli and Pistaferri (2017) state age, cohort and
time effects cannot all be identified without ”imposing non testable assumptions”. 27
Even when controls for all three effects, cohort, age and time, can be identified,
they only control for additive effects. There will be a difference across ages that vary
with time. For example, the age coefficients, βa, will be stripped of average cohort and
average time effects for all ages. This assumes, for example, that a macroeconomic
shock affects all ages in the same way. There will also be household specific effects
(e.g. a household with high debt may have a different response to a rise in interest
rate than a household with high savings).
We are interested in estimating the lifecycle profile of consumption (Equation
26To do this, two columns of the time dummies are dropped (coefficients for the first two years
can be recovered) and a set of treated time dummies for t = 3, .., 8, is defined, dropping the year
superscript for simplicity, d∗t = Dt + (1− t)D2 + (t− 2)D1. Dt are the usual dummies for time that
equal 1 when the year is t and 0 otherwise.
27Note that this control only captures the additive effect of macroeconomic shocks of time (Jappelli
and Pistaferri (2017)), not those where time effects are not additively separable from age. The
assumption then is that time effects are the same for all ages. There are other solutions in the
literature. For example McKenzie (2006) suggests a second differencing approach. In this paper, we
will begin with cohort, age and follow Deaton and Paxson (1994) with orthogonalised time.
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1), for the Pooled Lifecycle model, the Time-varying Lifecycle model. Given the
discussion around the time, cohort and age effects, we experiment with estimations
using different combinations of these controls. To establish the best specification, the
information criteria are compared.
The modified model for this exercise is
ci,t = αi + βg,tAgei,g,t + γcCohorti,t + δtd
∗




i,g Case 1 - Pooled Lifecycle
DAgei,g ×DT imei,t Case 2 - Time-varying Lifecycle
Where Cohorti,t is a set of cohort dummies, one for each year of birth, with the last
one (youngest person) dropped. d∗t are the orthogonalised time dummies, one for each
year from period 3 - 9.
Results are reported in Table A.1 for the Pooled Lifecycle, and Table A.2 for the
Time-varying Lifecycle. Including time dummies and cohort dummies is labelled All,
including only cohort dummies, Cohort, and including only time dummies, Time.
Note that age is controlled for in both models by Ageig and Ageigt.
Both the Pooled and Time-varying Lifecycle estimations favour including time
dummies and excluding cohort dummies. Also, the coefficients for cohort, γc are
not significant. We thus drop cohort dummies from the model and retain pure time
dummies, Dit and age dummies, Ageit, for the Pooled Lifecycle model, age time
dummies, βgt, for the Time-varying Lifecycle model.
In summary, we ask an age-time question; is the spending allocation of a 30 year
old in 1980 the same as a 30 year old in 1990? This is the same question as asking
if the spending of someone born in 1950 is the same as someone born in 1960 when
13
Table A.1: Pooled Lifecycle Model:Comparison of Information Criteria for different controls.
All Cohort Time
AIC 56740.1 56984.4 56698.1
BIC 58132.4 58315.7 57455.2
df m 159 152 86
t statistics in parentheses
Table A.2: Time-Varying Lifecycle Model:Comparison of Information Criteria for different controls.
All Cohort Time
AIC 56697.9 56706.9 56663.5
BIC 58716.7 58664.8 58047.1
df m 231 224 158
t statistics in parentheses
they are 30, ie in 1980 and 1990. However, posing it as an age-time question, rather
than a cohort - time question, seems more productive for several reasons. First, it is
more parsimonious. Given the life span, there are a fixed number of ages whereas the
number of cohorts keeps increasing. Second, there is quite a lot of economic theory
about the lifecycle, but relatively little about cohort effects. Third, the lifecycle story
can be interpreted more directly. From the mid 1990’s there are relative changes in
consumption allocations between the age groups. We could not observe this from the
cohort perspective.
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Appendix B.4 Household Time-varying Controls
We also consider the contribution of the household characteristics included in Z. The
initial choice follows other work in lifecycle consumption, variables which are known
to affect consumption are included, see Section 2.2. All the are significant except
education, which is dropped due to multicollinearity. Education dummies denote
maximum education level achieved. There are four of these, the highest is a college
degree or higher. The sample has ages 24 to 80. Education level will only change
after the age of 24 either in non standard cases of adult education or, in the sub set
of graduates. Otherwise, after the age 24, there will be no change. Estimation is by
fixed effects. There is not sufficient time variance in the data to estimate the impact
of education level. We thus drop education from the model.
In the final specification we control for time but not cohort, and because of this,
can include standard time dummies, dt, not the orthogonalised version. From the
vector Z, education is dropped. We use data that are scaled by the OECD equivalence
scale and also include dummies for number of children and number of adults.
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Appendix B.5 Reference Group
In Equations 1 - 2 we want to identify age effects in time. We have g age groups,
1,...,G and t time periods, 1,..., T.
Agei,g,t, is abbreviated as AgTt in this Section for ease of notation.
βg,t can be interpreted as the log difference in average consumption for each age-
time pair, from the reference group. However, there are different ways to parameterise
the age/time and time effects and this may affect this interpretation. Because the
parameters of interest have two dimensions, age and time, for the reference group
we can drop the first age group in the first time period or we can drop the first age
group for all time periods. We want to be able to interpret the βgt coefficients with
reference to their own age group and also in a specific time period, i.e. across time in
groups (time series) and as lifecycles for different years (cross-sections). We estimate
both specifications described above and compare the results;
Case A
Leave out age group 1, for all t, include age group 2 - G for all time periods; A2T1 −
AGTT . Include T-1 time dummies, dropping t = 1. There are NT − 1 parameters.
Case B
Leave out age group 1 in time period 1 only, A1T1 and leave out all time dummies.
Again we have NT − 1 parameters. Comparing the results we find the following:
In Case A, the coefficients of the T − 1 time dummies δAt , are identical to the






The coefficient of A2T1, β
A
2,1 in A is identical to the coefficients on A2T1, β
B
2,1 in B.
The coefficient of A2Tt+1 in model B is equal to the coefficient of A2Tt+1 in model
A plus the coefficient βB1,t+1, which by (A.2) is identical to the time dummy in the






where i = (0, 1, ..., T − 1)
In both cases, the base case is β1,1 and this acts to scale all the other coefficients.
In Case A, the age time coefficients are
βAg,t = βg,t − βB1,t︸︷︷︸
=δAt
−βB1,1 (A.3)
for g = 2, ..., G and t = 2, ..., T
The δt coefficients capture average time effects from the perspective of the omitted
age group. Although the time effects affect all age groups together, they nonetheless
are a configuration of year effects and the consumption of the omitted age group; the
two cannot be disentangled. In our example age group 1 is omitted. If a different age
group was left out, the value of the δt’s would be different.
In Case B
βBg,t = βg,t − βB1,1 (A.4)
for g = 1, ..., G and t = 2, ..., T
In Case B, the age time coefficient includes the value of δt; the average time effect
plus the omitted age group’s consumption.
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Being clear about the effects of different parameterisations is important for inter-
pretation of the age-time coefficients. In Cases A and B, the base group is always
the first age group in the first time period. This is a constant, subtracted from each
age-time coefficient from group 2 - G. The group one coefficients, for the remaining
time periods (t+1) - T are a configuration of average time effects and the consump-
tion level of the youngest age group, δt. In Case A, these δt’s are subtracted from the
corresponding age - time coefficients, Equation (A.4) which can then be interpreted
as a cross-sectional lifecycle from the perspective of the youngest age group in each
of the time periods. Alternatively, organised by age group over time, the coefficients
can be interpreted as a time series of consumption by age group from the perspective
of the first time period for that age group. If this were not the case then drawing
conclusions about the evolution of the βgt’s would be less clear. Thus Case A is se-
lected, noting that although we cannot separate time effects entirely, we can at least
narrow it down to the an age group specific response. For further details on the data
and specification issues see St Aubyn (2018).
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Appendix B.6 Different Approaches to Estimating Consump-
tion over the Lifecycle
Consumption over the lifecycle can be estimated in different ways. What effect do
different approaches have on the results? As an additional robustness check, and
because the estimation method is important to our results, we consider the effect of
alternative specifications.
Three models and estimation approaches are considered here. We estimate Equa-
tion 1. Because the data are in panels, we can compare estimation results from 1)
pooling all the ages over all time periods (Pooled Lifecycle model), and 2) interact-
ing age and time (Time-varying Lifecycle model). We can separate this approach in
another way, 3) estimating the age effects by year as a cross-section (Repeated Cross-
sectional model). Pooled Lifecycle models and Cross-sectional models are commonly
used in the literature. Both Pooled Lifecycle and Time-varying Lifecycle models can
be estimated by OLS or by fixed effects that differ in their treatment of unobserved
household effects. We can therefore differentiate the impact of controlling for unob-
served household effects, which are likely to be correlated with age by inspecting the
fixed effects versus OLS estimates.
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B.6.1 Pooled Lifecycle Model: OLS versus Fixed Effects
OLS Estimation
This is a standard approach in estimating consumption over the lifecycle. The
households in each age group in every time period are pooled and the average effect
estimated by βg.
Estimating by OLS means there are no controls for unobserved household level
effects, αi so the residuals take the form vit = αi + εit. It is likely that they will
be correlated with age; cov(Ageig, αi) 6= 0. This means the estimators will likely be
biased. If the covariance of Zit with Ageig is not zero this will also effect the value of
the βg’s.
Fixed Effects Estimation
Now unobserved household effects can be controlled for. The approach means that
the αi’s are subtracted out of the data. This removes any bias in the nine βg’s that
resulted from cov(Ageig, αi). The remaining impact of this estimation approach is a
scaling effect on all the variables that change over time. The fixed effects procedure




Figure A.5 display the results. Both OLS and FE deliver similar age profiles of
nondurable consumption and food consumption, although for nondurable consump-
tion which includes a more varied set of spending categories that can be much more
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Figure A.5: Estimates of age effects for nondurable consumption (left) and food (right). Age groups
are pooled over all time periods, 1998 - 2014. Fixed effects (dashed line) and OLS (solid line).
B.6.2 Time-varying Lifecycle: OLS versus Fixed Effects
We are estimating Equation 1, the Time-varying Lifecycle model. Each estimate is
the difference with reference to the youngest age group in the first period.
1. By OLS, where we do not control for unobserved household effects.
2. By fixed effects, where we do control for unobserved household effects and where
vit = εit + αi.
Figure A.6 shows coefficient plots from estimation of the pooled model over the
PSID with three different specifications of household level controls. We restrict con-
trols to exclude employment status, education, house ownership and state of residence.
And then add each of these into the model. We find that the OLS coefficients are
very sensitive to these changes. Fixed effects estimation is not, it remains very stable
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as we change the controls. 28 This exercise reinforces the importance of controlling
for household unobserved effects when estimating consumption over the lifecycle.
Two of the controls are particularly relevant for the OLS estimation. House own-
ership has a sizable level effect on age profiles while employment status affects the
final part of the lifecycle, due to retirement decisions. Aguiar and Hurst (2013) dis-
cuss this finding in detail, linking the fall in consumption at later ages due to the
lack of work related expenditures. The FE model, by controlling for all unobserved
characteristics, eliminates the biases on the estimated age profiles generated due to
the lack of household specific controls, delivering robust lifecycle profiles. For food
consumption controls do not significantly affect the results. Finally, when we disag-
gregate the profiles by time, there are systematic cross year differences within the
fixed effects estimations that are not obvious in the OLS specification, Figure A.7.
The fixed effects pattern pivots over the years from an upward slope to a downward
one.
28Carrying out the same exercise over the CEX with education shows that the CEX is less sensitive













































Bnchmrk OLS Bnchmrk FE
OLS Robustness 1 OLS Robustness 2
Figure A.6: OLS Robustness with respect to Controls: Both Benchmark FE Model and Benchmark
OLS Model include benchmark controls (number of adults, number of children, time, race, education
levels, home ownership, self-employment, disability, marital status, and state of residence). In
OLS Robustness 1, home ownership is excluded from benchmark controls. In OLS Robustness 2,











































































































































































































Cross Sectional Lifecycle Plots by Year, FE; 1998 − 2014
Figure A.7: βOLSgt estimates (left panel) and β
FE
gt estimates (right panel)
B.6.3 Repeated Cross-sections
We estimate Equation 1, by OLS over repeated cross-sections, i.e. T sets of estimates,
one for each time period. Each estimation yields G− 1 coefficients, βgt.
There are three sorts of bias that can arise in estimates of βgt from this approach.
The vector of controls in Zit varies in each time period, so rather than estimating
their effect as an average over all time periods it is an average for one time period.
The covariance cov(Ageigt, Zit) may or may not equal zero and this may vary in each
period and thus in each set of estimation results. Second, we cannot control for
unobserved household effects αi and these are very likely to be correlated with age
in each year. The above introduce bias in βgt. Third, we cannot control for average
time effects in this approach. If correlated with the Ageigt, this will also bias the
estimators βgt.
The plots of the estimated coefficients are not reported here but show that al-
though there is variation from year to year, the overall shape of the lifecycle plot is
sloping upwards with age. This is consistent with the estimation of Pooled Lifecycle
model estimated with OLS above. The difference between these two approaches is
the covariance of the unobserved household effects, ε and controls, Zit with Ageigt.
Information criteria are reported in Table A.3.
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B.6.4 Comparison by Information Criteria
Various models estimated here are sometimes nested versions of each other and some-
times not. One way of comparing all of them, regardless of the structure and rela-
tionship, is by information criteria.
For the repeated cross-sections estimation the AIC and BIC are summed for each
time period. The sum of the individual information criteria is an appropriate com-
parison to the AIC and BIC of the benchmark model estimated by the fixed effects
specification. Table A.3 displays our results.
Model obs LL Null LL Mod df AIC BIC
Equation 1: FE, Time-varying, 44149 -29602.2 -28081.5 160 56483.07 57874.33
Equation 1: OLS, Time-varying 44149 -52930.1 -45129.5 164 90587.02 92013.06
Equation 1: FE, Pooled 44149 -29602.2 -28174.8 88 56525.66 57290.84
Equation 1: OLS, Pooled 44149 -52930.1 -45167.7 92 90519.4 91319.37
Equation 1: Repeated Cross-sections
Year
1998 4156 -3614 -2710 84 5588 6120
2000 4395 -3908 -2888 84 5943 6480
2002 4557 -4239 -3033 84 6234 6774
2004 4605 -4489 -3159 85 6489 7036
2006 4706 -5001 -3711 86 7593 8148
2008 4832 -5141 -3934 86 8040 8597
2010 4838 -4972 -3735 86 7642 8199
2012 4833 -5167 -3933 84 8033 8578
2014 4763 -4925 -3688 83 7541 8078
Total 63104 68010.99
Table A.3: Information criteria for the different approaches for estimating the lifecycle consumption
profile.
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C Data Description, Consumer Expenditure Sur-
vey (CEX)
CEX Non durable consumption variable
As a robustness check, in section 2.2.1 we estimate the pooled model by OLS over
data from CEX. We detail the composition of the nondurable consumption variable
and household level controls below.
We use quarterly data from the CEX from the time periods to match the PSID data;
Q1 1999 - Q4 2014. The expenditure data are scaled for household composition using
the OECD scales, as set out in section Appendix B.1. The data are also deflated as
set out in section Appendix B.2.
We construct nondurable consumption to match the PSID version as closely as pos-
sible. There are some differences which are detailed here.
PSID CEX
Food Food29
heat, electricity, other energy, phone bill
water water
Medical costs, doctor health expenditures
prescriptions, hospital,nursing home
Child care babysit
bus,cabs, parking public transport
Vehicle repair, insurance Vehicle expenditure - services
servicing; additional vehicle costs
rent - rent or 6% house value rent paid, mortgage interest property tax30
- life insurance
gasoline gasoline
health insurance health insurance
house insurance house expenditures (services)
Table A.4: Non durable consumption composition in the PSID and CEX.
Household level controls in the CEX closely match our PSID baseline controls,
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set out in section 2.1. These are, number of adults, number of children in the house-
hold (under 18), a dummy for married households, being a home owner, completed
education. We do not include a dummy for state of residence.
Not all our results can be reproduced in the CEX. We are restricted to cases
where there is no need for fixed effects estimation. We compare 1) unconditioned
consumption over the lifecycle 2) age group coefficient values from estimating our
pooled model by OLS 3) coefficient values for the time varying model, estimated by
OLS, over the PSID and CEX. In each case considered, both data sets give similar
results.
First, comparing deflated and scaled nondurable consumption by age, without
additional household controls, confirms the general life cycle shapes are similar for
both data sets (results not shown). Because the CEX data are recorded quarterly
and the PSID reports annual figures, there is a difference in scale. The CEX shows a
lifecycle peak a little earlier and also a steeper fall in consumption after retirement.
We re-estimate the pooled model, case 1, equation 1, over log nondurable con-
sumption in both data sets. Household controls are aligned closely although there
are some differences.31 Figure 4 plots the age group coefficients from these estima-
tions. There are some differences in scale, addressed for comparison by rescaling the
coefficients, and standard errors (not shown). Differences in standard errors are to
be expected given the relative sizes of the data sets. The correlation between the
coefficients is 0.82.
The time varying model, equation case 2, 1, is estimated by OLS over both data
sets. Although the PSID plots are a little noisier, we see the repeated hump shaped
lifecycle shapes in both cases.
31The controls for the CEX are set out in C
27
These results go some way to showing that both the CEX and PSID yield similar



















































































































































































































































































































Cross Sectional Lifecycle Plots by Year, OLS; 1998 − 2014
Figure A.8: βOLSPSIDgt estimates (left panel) and β
OLSCEX
gt estimates (right panel)
D Additional Robustness Results
We run several specifications for robustness. Figures not presented in the main text
are presented here. We report the estimates of the benchmark model with 10 age
groups (Figure A.9) and the results of the estimation of the benchmark model using
a sample of homeowners (Figure A.10), using the long sample with imputed consump-
tion data (Figure fig:robust2), introducing controls for household specific economic
variables, income (yi,t) and household’s subject value of housing Hi,t (Figure A.12),
looking at consumption subcategories (Figure A.13), and partitioning the sample to
look at different levels of education (Figure A.14)and to focus on households where
the head or the spouse do not change over time (Figure A.15).
32Information on the composition of the nondurable consumption and the controls used in the



















































































































































































































































































































































































































Age−Time Effects by Age and Year
Lifecycle 1998 2014: Benchmark Model
Figure A.9: Model with 10 age groups - Full Sample: Top Coefficients by age group. Bottom


















































































































































































































































































































































































































Age−Time Effects by Age and Year
Lifecycle 1998 2014: Benchmark Model − Homeowners
Figure A.10: Model with 10 age groups - Homeowners: Top Coefficients by age group. Bottom























































































































































































































































































Lifecycle Consumption (Long Sample)
Figure A.11: Age group coefficients: Results from Long Data Set. Top Coefficients by age group.

















































































































































































Age−Time Effects by Age and Year
Lifecycle 1998 2014: with Econ Controls
Figure A.12: Model with additional economic controls: Top Coefficients by age group. Bottom



























































































































































































































































































































































Figure A.13: Sub-categories age group coefficients: Each dashed line depicts βg,t for a selected
year of the wave of the survey, (1998, 2006 and 2014), depicting the estimated lifecycle pattern of
consumption for each year. The dark line depicts the age effects βg when age effects pools information
















































































































































































































































































University Degree or Higher
Benchmark (blue), Education Level  (red)
Education and Lifecycle Consumption
















































































































































































Lifecycle Income and Family Composition
Figure A.15: Age Group Estimates including only Stable Households
E Additional Results - Interaction Models
We report the results of the interaction model when both house value and income are
included.
F Additional Results - Income Lifecycle Variation
We report the results of the income estimation using labour income instead of total
family income (Figure A.17), by controlling for subjective house values (Figure A.18),


























































































































































































































































































Benchmark (blue), Three−way Joint Income and SHV Model (red)
Lifecycle Profiles
Figure A.16: Age group coefficients: Benchmark Model (Equation 2) and Joint Income and Hous-
ing Interaction Model (Equation 3), Whole Sample. Top Panel: βg,t from Equation 2 (blue) and






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Time−varying Total Family Income with SHV Control
















































































































































































































































































University Degree or Higher
Benchmark (blue), Education Level  (red)
Education and Lifecycle Consumption
Figure A.19: Lifecycle Income: Age Group Estimates for Groups with Different Education Levels





















































































































































































































































































Lifecycle Income (Long Sample)






















































































































































































Lifecycle Income and Family Composition
Figure A.21: Lifecycle Income: Age Group Estimates with Stable Households
G Estimation: Age-Time Effects with 4 Age Groups
Table A.5 show the full results of the estimation of the benchmark model Case 1
- Pooled Lifecycle and Case 2 - Time-varying Lifecycle with and without economic
35
controls. Table A.6 show the full results of the estimation of the benchmark model
Case 2 - Time-varying Lifecycle and the Interaction Models.
Table A.5: Benchmark Estimations: Nondurable Consumption Expenditures
(1) (2) (3)




t2000 0.05∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.06∗∗ (0.01) 0.04∗ (0.05)
t2002 0.07∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.10∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.07∗∗ (0.00)
t2004 0.07∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.10∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.05 (0.06)
t2006 0.05∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.09∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.03 (0.27)
t2008 -0.06∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.03 (0.32) -0.03 (0.24)
t2010 -0.02 (0.13) 0.13∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.05 (0.07)
t2012 -0.07∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.10∗∗ (0.00) 0.02 (0.60)
t2014 -0.05∗∗ (0.01) 0.14∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.03 (0.36)
# Adults = 2 -0.08∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.09∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.00 (0.82)
# Adults = 3 -0.20∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.22∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.05∗ (0.04)
# Adults = 4 -0.32∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.34∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.09∗∗ (0.00)
# Adults = 5 -0.45∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.48∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.18∗∗∗ (0.00)
# Adults = 6 -0.46∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.47∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.10 (0.39)
# Adults = 7 -0.88∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.86∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.48∗∗ (0.01)
# Adults = 8 0.57∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.61∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.73∗∗∗ (0.00)
# Child = 2 -0.13∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.15∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.07∗∗∗ (0.00)
# Child = 3 -0.29∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.31∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.17∗∗∗ (0.00)
# Child = 4 -0.42∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.45∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.25∗∗∗ (0.00)
# Child = 5 -0.55∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.59∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.34∗∗∗ (0.00)
# Child = 6 -0.66∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.70∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.42∗∗∗ (0.00)
# Child = 7 -0.51∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.55∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.22 (0.08)
# Child = 8 -0.52∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.58∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.23∗ (0.04)
# Child = 9 -0.56∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.61∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.28∗∗ (0.00)
# Child = 10 -0.74∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.79∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.53∗∗∗ (0.00)
# Child = 11 -1.76∗∗∗ (0.00) -1.83∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.82∗∗∗ (0.00)
# Child = 12 -0.80∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.95∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.61∗∗∗ (0.00)
White -0.09 (0.10) -0.08 (0.10) -0.08 (0.08)
Black 0.14 (0.18) 0.14 (0.20) 0.13 (0.21)
State 2 0.28∗∗ (0.01) 0.27∗ (0.01) 0.18 (0.08)
State 3 0.06 (0.71) 0.06 (0.71) 0.07 (0.69)
State 4 0.45∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.43∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.35∗∗ (0.00)
State 5 0.35∗∗ (0.00) 0.34∗∗ (0.00) 0.25∗ (0.02)
State 6 0.23 (0.11) 0.20 (0.16) 0.19 (0.17)
State 7 0.30∗ (0.02) 0.29∗ (0.02) 0.23 (0.08)
State 8 0.19 (0.13) 0.17 (0.17) 0.07 (0.59)
State 9 0.10 (0.34) 0.10 (0.37) 0.09 (0.39)
State 10 0.22∗ (0.03) 0.21∗ (0.04) 0.17 (0.10)
State 11 0.02 (0.89) 0.00 (1.00) 0.01 (0.95)
State 12 0.29∗ (0.02) 0.28∗ (0.03) 0.24 (0.06)
State 13 -0.08 (0.53) -0.09 (0.46) -0.15 (0.22)
State 14 0.07 (0.52) 0.07 (0.53) 0.07 (0.55)
State 15 0.09 (0.47) 0.08 (0.53) 0.09 (0.49)
State 16 -0.08 (0.56) -0.10 (0.46) -0.14 (0.31)
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State 17 -0.21 (0.16) -0.23 (0.13) -0.20 (0.17)
State 18 0.39∗ (0.03) 0.36∗ (0.04) 0.19 (0.26)
State 19 0.27∗ (0.02) 0.26∗ (0.02) 0.14 (0.21)
State 20 0.17 (0.39) 0.16 (0.42) 0.26∗ (0.05)
State 21 0.25 (0.12) 0.23 (0.15) 0.14 (0.30)
State 22 0.41∗∗ (0.01) 0.39∗∗ (0.01) 0.31∗ (0.03)
State 23 0.30∗ (0.02) 0.29∗ (0.03) 0.25 (0.07)
State 24 0.10 (0.38) 0.09 (0.40) 0.09 (0.37)
State 25 0.36 (0.08) 0.35 (0.09) 0.23 (0.27)
State 26 0.06 (0.62) 0.05 (0.67) -0.02 (0.89)
State 27 0.38∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.36∗∗ (0.00) 0.29∗ (0.01)
State 28 0.44 (0.08) 0.44 (0.08) 0.35 (0.14)
State 29 0.25∗ (0.04) 0.24∗ (0.04) 0.16 (0.15)
State 30 0.29∗ (0.02) 0.26∗ (0.03) 0.14 (0.21)
State 31 0.29∗ (0.01) 0.27∗ (0.02) 0.21∗ (0.05)
State 32 0.15 (0.14) 0.14 (0.19) 0.12 (0.24)
State 33 0.56∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.57∗∗ (0.00) 0.51∗∗∗ (0.00)
State 34 0.18 (0.14) 0.17 (0.17) 0.12 (0.31)
State 35 -0.02 (0.91) -0.03 (0.83) -0.10 (0.46)
State 36 0.17 (0.18) 0.16 (0.22) 0.10 (0.41)
State 37 0.26∗ (0.01) 0.25∗ (0.02) 0.19 (0.06)
State 38 0.26 (0.26) 0.26 (0.26) 0.31 (0.17)
State 39 0.12 (0.29) 0.12 (0.31) 0.10 (0.39)
State 40 0.10 (0.46) 0.08 (0.57) 0.10 (0.43)
State 41 0.22 (0.09) 0.21 (0.10) 0.13 (0.32)
State 42 0.27∗ (0.03) 0.26∗ (0.04) 0.23 (0.05)
State 43 0.26∗ (0.04) 0.25 (0.05) 0.16 (0.18)
State 44 0.01 (0.98) -0.03 (0.87) -0.10 (0.55)
State 45 0.21 (0.06) 0.20 (0.08) 0.12 (0.30)
State 46 0.23 (0.05) 0.23 (0.06) 0.19 (0.10)
State 47 0.44∗∗ (0.01) 0.43∗∗ (0.01) 0.36∗ (0.02)
State 48 0.19 (0.13) 0.16 (0.19) 0.08 (0.53)
State 49 0.27∗ (0.03) 0.26∗ (0.04) 0.13 (0.30)
State 50 0.42∗ (0.01) 0.39∗ (0.02) 0.29 (0.07)
State 51 0.66∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.67∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.55∗∗∗ (0.00)
Nohome -0.24∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.23∗∗∗ (0.00) 1.85∗∗∗ (0.00)
SelfEmp 0.03 (0.11) 0.02 (0.25) 0.00 (0.79)
Disability -0.06∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.06∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.03∗ (0.04)
Marital Status 0.00 (0.83) -0.01 (0.58) 0.00 (1.00)
AB2xt1998 0.10∗∗ (0.00) 0.06∗ (0.04)
AB2xt2000 0.07∗ (0.01) 0.03 (0.27)
AB2xt2002 0.07∗∗ (0.01) 0.04 (0.09)
AB2xt2004 0.06∗ (0.02) 0.04 (0.14)
AB2xt2006 0.07∗∗ (0.01) 0.04 (0.11)
AB2xt2008 0.01 (0.75) -0.01 (0.75)
AB2xt2010 -0.05 (0.06) -0.04 (0.10)
AB2xt2012 -0.03 (0.28) -0.03 (0.30)
AB2xt2014 -0.03 (0.35) -0.01 (0.67)
AB3xt1998 0.18∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.11∗∗∗ (0.00)
AB3xt2000 0.14∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.07∗ (0.02)
AB3xt2002 0.08∗∗ (0.00) 0.04 (0.14)
AB3xt2004 0.10∗∗ (0.00) 0.07∗ (0.03)
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AB3xt2006 0.08∗ (0.01) 0.05 (0.10)
AB3xt2008 0.03 (0.43) 0.03 (0.36)
AB3xt2010 -0.08∗ (0.02) -0.05 (0.09)
AB3xt2012 -0.10∗∗ (0.01) -0.07∗ (0.03)
AB3xt2014 -0.15∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.09∗ (0.02)
AB4xt1998 0.24∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.15∗∗∗ (0.00)
AB4xt2000 0.25∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.15∗∗∗ (0.00)
AB4xt2002 0.15∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.09∗ (0.01)
AB4xt2004 0.14∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.10∗∗ (0.01)
AB4xt2006 0.09∗ (0.02) 0.06 (0.10)
AB4xt2008 0.02 (0.53) 0.02 (0.48)
AB4xt2010 -0.11∗∗ (0.01) -0.08∗ (0.03)
AB4xt2012 -0.18∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.13∗∗∗ (0.00)
AB4xt2014 -0.22∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.15∗∗∗ (0.00)
Income 0.17∗∗∗ (0.00)
SHV 0.19∗∗∗ (0.00)
Observations 44149 44149 43512
Adjusted R2 0.058 0.062 0.115
AIC 56654.56 56465.81 49054.34
BIC 57367.57 57387.51 49991.86
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table A.6: Nondurable Consumption Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Benchmark Interaction: SHV Interaction: TFI Interaction: Joint SHV and TFI
AB2xt1998 0.06∗ (0.04) 0.19∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.24 (0.63) -0.48 (0.35)
AB2xt2000 0.03 (0.27) 0.11∗ (0.03) -0.76 (0.07) -0.95∗ (0.02)
AB2xt2002 0.04 (0.09) 0.08 (0.07) -1.08∗∗ (0.00) -1.21∗∗ (0.00)
AB2xt2004 0.04 (0.14) -0.07 (0.25) -1.42∗∗ (0.00) -1.38∗∗ (0.01)
AB2xt2006 0.04 (0.11) -0.07 (0.11) -2.33∗∗∗ (0.00) -2.41∗∗∗ (0.00)
AB2xt2008 -0.01 (0.75) -0.12∗ (0.02) -2.33∗∗∗ (0.00) -2.61∗∗∗ (0.00)
AB2xt2010 -0.04 (0.10) -0.17∗∗∗ (0.00) -2.17∗∗∗ (0.00) -2.28∗∗∗ (0.00)
AB2xt2012 -0.03 (0.30) -0.17∗∗∗ (0.00) -2.49∗∗∗ (0.00) -2.56∗∗∗ (0.00)
AB2xt2014 -0.01 (0.67) -0.11∗ (0.02) -1.25∗∗∗ (0.00) -1.20∗∗∗ (0.00)
AB3xt1998 0.11∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.15 (0.06) -0.50 (0.26) -0.74 (0.10)
AB3xt2000 0.07∗ (0.02) 0.13 (0.08) -0.76 (0.06) -0.99∗ (0.01)
AB3xt2002 0.04 (0.14) 0.03 (0.64) -0.90∗∗∗ (0.00) -1.12∗∗∗ (0.00)
AB3xt2004 0.07∗ (0.03) -0.08 (0.31) -1.45∗∗∗ (0.00) -1.53∗∗∗ (0.00)
AB3xt2006 0.05 (0.10) -0.17∗ (0.01) -1.69∗∗∗ (0.00) -1.78∗∗∗ (0.00)
AB3xt2008 0.03 (0.36) -0.15∗ (0.03) -1.41∗∗∗ (0.00) -1.53∗∗∗ (0.00)
AB3xt2010 -0.05 (0.09) -0.25∗∗∗ (0.00) -1.44∗∗∗ (0.00) -1.47∗∗∗ (0.00)
AB3xt2012 -0.07∗ (0.03) -0.36∗∗∗ (0.00) -2.56∗∗∗ (0.00) -2.56∗∗∗ (0.00)
AB3xt2014 -0.09∗ (0.02) -0.42∗∗∗ (0.00) -2.51∗∗∗ (0.00) -2.44∗∗∗ (0.00)
AB4xt1998 0.15∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.03 (0.86) -0.64 (0.27) -0.70 (0.19)
AB4xt2000 0.15∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.28 (0.07) -0.40 (0.20) -0.71∗∗ (0.01)
AB4xt2002 0.09∗ (0.01) -0.10 (0.42) -0.65∗ (0.04) -0.85∗∗ (0.00)
AB4xt2004 0.10∗∗ (0.01) -0.24∗ (0.05) -0.85∗ (0.02) -0.81∗ (0.02)
AB4xt2006 0.06 (0.10) -0.31∗ (0.05) -1.11 (0.10) -1.01 (0.14)
AB4xt2008 0.02 (0.48) -0.26∗∗ (0.01) -1.60∗∗∗ (0.00) -1.66∗∗∗ (0.00)
AB4xt2010 -0.08∗ (0.03) -0.42∗∗∗ (0.00) -1.24∗∗∗ (0.00) -1.37∗∗∗ (0.00)
AB4xt2012 -0.13∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.79∗∗∗ (0.00) -2.62∗∗∗ (0.00) -2.59∗∗∗ (0.00)
AB4xt2014 -0.15∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.58∗∗∗ (0.00) -2.32∗∗∗ (0.00) -2.29∗∗∗ (0.00)
t2000 0.04∗ (0.05) 0.07∗∗ (0.00) 0.06∗∗ (0.01) 0.07∗∗ (0.00)
t2002 0.07∗∗ (0.00) 0.12∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.09∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.11∗∗∗ (0.00)
t2004 0.05 (0.06) 0.12∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.10∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.12∗∗∗ (0.00)
t2006 0.03 (0.27) 0.12∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.09∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.12∗∗∗ (0.00)
t2008 -0.03 (0.24) 0.06 (0.05) 0.04 (0.10) 0.07∗ (0.01)
t2010 0.05 (0.07) 0.16∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.13∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.15∗∗∗ (0.00)
t2012 0.02 (0.60) 0.13∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.11∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.13∗∗∗ (0.00)
t2014 0.03 (0.36) 0.19∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.14∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.18∗∗∗ (0.00)
# Adults = 2 0.00 (0.82) -0.08∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.09∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.07∗∗∗ (0.00)
# Adults = 3 -0.05∗ (0.04) -0.21∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.19∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.18∗∗∗ (0.00)
# Adults = 4 -0.09∗∗ (0.00) -0.32∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.29∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.27∗∗∗ (0.00)
# Adults = 5 -0.18∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.44∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.40∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.38∗∗∗ (0.00)
# Adults = 6 -0.10 (0.39) -0.36∗∗ (0.00) -0.42∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.31∗∗ (0.01)
# Adults = 7 -0.48∗∗ (0.01) -0.82∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.68∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.68∗∗∗ (0.00)
# Adults = 8 0.73∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.43∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.71∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.46∗∗∗ (0.00)
# Child = 2 -0.07∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.14∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.13∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.12∗∗∗ (0.00)
# Child = 3 -0.17∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.30∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.28∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.27∗∗∗ (0.00)
# Child = 4 -0.25∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.44∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.41∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.40∗∗∗ (0.00)
# Child = 5 -0.34∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.58∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.53∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.52∗∗∗ (0.00)
# Child = 6 -0.42∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.69∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.63∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.62∗∗∗ (0.00)
# Child = 7 -0.22 (0.08) -0.53∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.43∗∗ (0.00) -0.41∗∗ (0.00)
# Child = 8 -0.23∗ (0.04) -0.59∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.47∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.46∗∗∗ (0.00)
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# Child = 9 -0.28∗∗ (0.00) -0.58∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.42∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.42∗∗∗ (0.00)
# Child = 10 -0.53∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.77∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.56∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.55∗∗∗ (0.00)
# Child = 11 -0.82∗∗∗ (0.00) -1.74∗∗∗ (0.00) -1.57∗∗∗ (0.00) -1.52∗∗∗ (0.00)
# Child = 12 -0.61∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.99∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.93∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.94∗∗∗ (0.00)
White -0.08 (0.08) -0.07 (0.18) -0.07 (0.11) -0.06 (0.20)
Black 0.13 (0.21) 0.17 (0.11) 0.12 (0.22) 0.15 (0.14)
State 2 0.18 (0.08) 0.25∗ (0.02) 0.25∗ (0.02) 0.23∗ (0.03)
State 3 0.07 (0.69) 0.05 (0.79) 0.09 (0.59) 0.08 (0.66)
State 4 0.35∗∗ (0.00) 0.41∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.41∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.39∗∗∗ (0.00)
State 5 0.25∗ (0.02) 0.32∗∗ (0.00) 0.31∗∗ (0.00) 0.30∗∗ (0.01)
State 6 0.19 (0.17) 0.21 (0.14) 0.24 (0.07) 0.26 (0.06)
State 7 0.23 (0.08) 0.28∗ (0.03) 0.29∗ (0.02) 0.28∗ (0.02)
State 8 0.07 (0.59) 0.15 (0.22) 0.13 (0.29) 0.12 (0.35)
State 9 0.09 (0.39) 0.09 (0.38) 0.08 (0.43) 0.07 (0.50)
State 10 0.17 (0.10) 0.21∗ (0.04) 0.18 (0.08) 0.17 (0.09)
State 11 0.01 (0.95) -0.03 (0.86) -0.02 (0.92) -0.04 (0.84)
State 12 0.24 (0.06) 0.27∗ (0.03) 0.30∗ (0.02) 0.29∗ (0.02)
State 13 -0.15 (0.22) -0.10 (0.43) -0.11 (0.39) -0.12 (0.32)
State 14 0.07 (0.55) 0.07 (0.53) 0.05 (0.65) 0.04 (0.69)
State 15 0.09 (0.49) 0.09 (0.48) 0.06 (0.67) 0.05 (0.68)
State 16 -0.14 (0.31) -0.13 (0.37) -0.17 (0.23) -0.19 (0.19)
State 17 -0.20 (0.17) -0.22 (0.14) -0.22 (0.13) -0.23 (0.13)
State 18 0.19 (0.26) 0.31 (0.10) 0.31 (0.08) 0.26 (0.17)
State 19 0.14 (0.21) 0.25∗ (0.03) 0.20 (0.06) 0.19 (0.08)
State 20 0.26∗ (0.05) 0.17 (0.40) 0.31∗ (0.01) 0.32∗ (0.01)
State 21 0.14 (0.30) 0.21 (0.21) 0.18 (0.18) 0.16 (0.25)
State 22 0.31∗ (0.03) 0.37∗ (0.01) 0.36∗ (0.01) 0.34∗ (0.02)
State 23 0.25 (0.07) 0.30∗ (0.03) 0.30∗ (0.02) 0.30∗ (0.03)
State 24 0.09 (0.37) 0.09 (0.44) 0.09 (0.40) 0.08 (0.44)
State 25 0.23 (0.27) 0.37 (0.10) 0.35 (0.08) 0.33 (0.13)
State 26 -0.02 (0.89) 0.05 (0.69) 0.06 (0.58) 0.05 (0.66)
State 27 0.29∗ (0.01) 0.36∗∗ (0.00) 0.34∗∗ (0.00) 0.34∗∗ (0.00)
State 28 0.35 (0.14) 0.41 (0.09) 0.43 (0.06) 0.43 (0.06)
State 29 0.16 (0.15) 0.24∗ (0.04) 0.21 (0.06) 0.21 (0.05)
State 30 0.14 (0.21) 0.23 (0.06) 0.21 (0.08) 0.19 (0.11)
State 31 0.21∗ (0.05) 0.29∗ (0.01) 0.21∗ (0.04) 0.21∗ (0.04)
State 32 0.12 (0.24) 0.13 (0.20) 0.10 (0.32) 0.10 (0.34)
State 33 0.51∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.52∗∗ (0.00) 0.57∗∗ (0.00) 0.50∗∗ (0.00)
State 34 0.12 (0.31) 0.16 (0.19) 0.16 (0.18) 0.15 (0.22)
State 35 -0.10 (0.46) -0.06 (0.64) -0.04 (0.77) -0.06 (0.64)
State 36 0.10 (0.41) 0.13 (0.30) 0.15 (0.23) 0.13 (0.30)
State 37 0.19 (0.06) 0.24∗ (0.02) 0.24∗ (0.02) 0.23∗ (0.03)
State 38 0.31 (0.17) 0.20 (0.38) 0.35 (0.16) 0.31 (0.21)
State 39 0.10 (0.39) 0.11 (0.31) 0.08 (0.49) 0.09 (0.44)
State 40 0.10 (0.43) 0.13 (0.36) 0.08 (0.55) 0.12 (0.42)
State 41 0.13 (0.32) 0.19 (0.15) 0.16 (0.20) 0.15 (0.24)
State 42 0.23 (0.05) 0.26∗ (0.03) 0.23∗ (0.04) 0.23∗ (0.04)
State 43 0.16 (0.18) 0.22 (0.08) 0.21 (0.09) 0.18 (0.13)
State 44 -0.10 (0.55) -0.03 (0.87) -0.05 (0.76) -0.03 (0.87)
State 45 0.12 (0.30) 0.21 (0.06) 0.18 (0.10) 0.19 (0.09)
State 46 0.19 (0.10) 0.21 (0.08) 0.22 (0.06) 0.21 (0.07)
State 47 0.36∗ (0.02) 0.37∗ (0.01) 0.51∗∗ (0.00) 0.43∗∗ (0.00)
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State 48 0.08 (0.53) 0.14 (0.24) 0.12 (0.31) 0.10 (0.42)
State 49 0.13 (0.30) 0.22 (0.09) 0.21 (0.08) 0.19 (0.15)
State 50 0.29 (0.07) 0.41∗∗ (0.01) 0.34∗ (0.03) 0.37∗ (0.02)
State 51 0.55∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.64∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.64∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.61∗∗∗ (0.00)
Nohome 1.85∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.11∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.21∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.12∗∗∗ (0.00)
SelfEmp 0.00 (0.79) 0.03 (0.11) 0.00 (0.79) 0.01 (0.57)
Disability -0.03∗ (0.04) -0.05∗∗∗ (0.00) -0.03∗ (0.04) -0.03 (0.06)
Marital Status 0.00 (1.00) -0.00 (0.86) -0.00 (0.64) -0.00 (0.78)
Income 0.17∗∗∗ (0.00)
SHV 0.19∗∗∗ (0.00)
SHVxAB2xt1998 -0.01 (0.12) -0.00 (0.57)
SHVxAB2xt2000 -0.00 (0.67) 0.00 (0.98)
SHVxAB2xt2002 0.00 (0.74) 0.00 (0.93)
SHVxAB2xt2004 0.02∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.01∗∗ (0.00)
SHVxAB2xt2006 0.02∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.01 (0.14)
SHVxAB2xt2008 0.02∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.00 (0.89)
SHVxAB2xt2010 0.02∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.00 (0.47)
SHVxAB2xt2012 0.02∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.00 (0.41)
SHVxAB2xt2014 0.01∗ (0.02) 0.00 (0.39)
SHVxAB3xt1998 0.01 (0.21) 0.01 (0.09)
SHVxAB3xt2000 0.01 (0.34) 0.01 (0.29)
SHVxAB3xt2002 0.01∗ (0.03) 0.01∗ (0.03)
SHVxAB3xt2004 0.02∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.02∗∗ (0.00)
SHVxAB3xt2006 0.03∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.02∗∗∗ (0.00)
SHVxAB3xt2008 0.02∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.02∗∗∗ (0.00)
SHVxAB3xt2010 0.02∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.02∗∗∗ (0.00)
SHVxAB3xt2012 0.03∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.02∗∗∗ (0.00)
SHVxAB3xt2014 0.03∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.02∗∗∗ (0.00)
SHVxAB4xt1998 0.02 (0.19) 0.02 (0.29)
SHVxAB4xt2000 -0.00 (0.81) -0.00 (0.92)
SHVxAB4xt2002 0.03∗ (0.01) 0.03∗ (0.02)
SHVxAB4xt2004 0.04∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.05∗∗∗ (0.00)
SHVxAB4xt2006 0.05∗∗ (0.00) 0.05∗∗∗ (0.00)
SHVxAB4xt2008 0.03∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.03∗∗∗ (0.00)
SHVxAB4xt2010 0.04∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.04∗∗∗ (0.00)
SHVxAB4xt2012 0.07∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.05∗∗∗ (0.00)
SHVxAB4xt2014 0.04∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.03∗∗∗ (0.00)
IncomexAB2xt1998 0.04 (0.46) 0.07 (0.21)
IncomexAB2xt2000 0.09∗ (0.03) 0.11∗ (0.01)
IncomexAB2xt2002 0.12∗∗ (0.00) 0.14∗∗∗ (0.00)
IncomexAB2xt2004 0.16∗∗ (0.00) 0.14∗∗ (0.01)
IncomexAB2xt2006 0.25∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.25∗∗∗ (0.00)
IncomexAB2xt2008 0.24∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.27∗∗∗ (0.00)
IncomexAB2xt2010 0.22∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.23∗∗∗ (0.00)
IncomexAB2xt2012 0.26∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.26∗∗∗ (0.00)
IncomexAB2xt2014 0.13∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.12∗∗∗ (0.00)
IncomexAB3xt1998 0.07 (0.11) 0.09∗ (0.04)
IncomexAB3xt2000 0.09∗ (0.02) 0.11∗∗ (0.00)
IncomexAB3xt2002 0.10∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.12∗∗∗ (0.00)
IncomexAB3xt2004 0.16∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.15∗∗∗ (0.00)
IncomexAB3xt2006 0.18∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.17∗∗∗ (0.00)
IncomexAB3xt2008 0.15∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.15∗∗∗ (0.00)
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IncomexAB3xt2010 0.14∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.13∗∗∗ (0.00)
IncomexAB3xt2012 0.25∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.24∗∗∗ (0.00)
IncomexAB3xt2014 0.24∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.22∗∗∗ (0.00)
IncomexAB4xt1998 0.09 (0.13) 0.08 (0.10)
IncomexAB4xt2000 0.06∗ (0.04) 0.10∗∗ (0.00)
IncomexAB4xt2002 0.08∗∗ (0.01) 0.08∗ (0.02)
IncomexAB4xt2004 0.10∗∗ (0.00) 0.05 (0.12)
IncomexAB4xt2006 0.13 (0.07) 0.07 (0.29)
IncomexAB4xt2008 0.17∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.15∗∗∗ (0.00)
IncomexAB4xt2010 0.12∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.10∗∗∗ (0.00)
IncomexAB4xt2012 0.26∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.21∗∗∗ (0.00)
IncomexAB4xt2014 0.22∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.19∗∗∗ (0.00)
Observations 43512 43641 44010 43512
Adjusted R2 0.115 0.069 0.099 0.101
AIC 49054.34 55150.80 50870.32 49824.91
BIC 49991.86 56305.74 52026.38 51213.84
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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H Asset Profiles - Theoretical model
Figure A.22: Calibration: Lifecycle profiles of homeownership, non-housing wealth and housing
wealth. Model versus SCF 1998 Data
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Figure A.23: Asset Life Cycle Profiles: The Role of Changes in Income Profiles and Credit/House
Prices During the Boom. Data: Survey of Consumer Finance - 2007)
Note: Model ν(age06), incorporates the change in income profile only (pink squares) - Model ν(age06) -
Credit/Housing, incorporates change in income profile, the relaxation in credit constraints and the increase in
the trend in house prices (dark plus sign).
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Figure A.24: Asset Life Cycle Profiles: The Role of Changes in Income Profiles and Credit/House
Prices During the Recession. Data: Survey of Consumer Finance - 2013)
Note: Model ν(age14), incorporates the change in income profile only (pink squares) - Model ν(age14) -
Credit/Housing, incorporates change in income profile, the tightening in credit constraints and the decrease in the
trend in house prices (dark plus sign).
45
